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ABSTRACT 
 With its abundant oil resources and as largest producer of oil in the world, the 
Arabian Gulf region is of crucial importance to the world. And, oil output from the region 
has been under threat from Iran since that country’s revolution in 1979. Using academic 
research as well as available reports from expert panels, government agencies, and media, 
this thesis examines the level of threat Iran poses to the Gulf oil industry in view of Iran's 
key military capabilities, including its naval and air capabilities, which could be used to 
disrupt Arabian Gulf oil production and shipping. This thesis focuses on case studies of 
specific incidents in which Iran has used these capabilities for similar ends in past 
attacks, including the 2019 sabotage attacks on civilian ships near Al Fujairah and the 
Gulf of Oman, and the combined cruise missile and drone attack on Saudi Arabia’s 
Shaybah and Aramco Abqaiq facilities. These case studies help establish how Iran can 
use its military capabilities against its neighbors and other adversaries in potential future 
attacks related to regional oil production and transport. Moreover, the analysis assesses 
the extent of the damage from such attacks, the constraints Iran faces in orchestrating its 
attacks, and the likelihood that it will attempt to take such action in the future. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Does Iran threaten the Arabian Gulf oil output? This thesis explores that issue by 
first examining Iran’s key military capabilities, particularly its air and naval capabilities 
that could be used to threaten Arabian Gulf oil production and shipping. This thesis then 
explores case studies wherein Iran has used these capabilities toward similar ends in past 
attacks, including the 2019 sabotage attacks on civilian ships near Fujairah and the Gulf 
of Oman, and the combined cruise missile and drone attack on Saudi Arabia’s Shaybah 
and Aramco Abqaiq facilities. These case studies help establish how Iran can use its 
military capabilities against its neighbors and perceived adversaries in any potential 
future attacks related to regional oil production and transport. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Arabian Gulf is a very crucial oil region and is home to the largest oil 
producers, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar, 
who export oil to the rest of the world. In the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) region, 
several oil factories and platforms export oil through the Strait of Hormuz (SOH). In fact, 
an estimated 21 million barrels, which is equal to 21% of global petroleum liquids 
consumption, transit the passage every day.1 In addition, the Gulf region is significant to 
the United States’ economy. In January 1980, President Jimmy Carter informed Congress 
that access to the Arabian Gulf’s oilfields was essential to the health of the U.S. 
economy.2 This policy, which was called “The Carter Doctrine,” emphasized the 
importance of the Gulf’s oil to the U.S. economy. To illustrate this importance, during the 
Iranian revolution in 1979, the U.S. sent a rapid deployment force to the Arabian Gulf to 
protect the oil supply from any further threat from the revolution. Iranian hostilities 
                                                 
1 EIA, “The Strait of Hormuz Is the World’s Most Important Oil Transit Chokepoint,” U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, June 20, 2019, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=39932. 
2 Michael T. Klare, “Oil, Iraq, and American Foreign Policy: The Continuing Salience of the Carter 
Doctrine,” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 62, no. 1 (March 2007): 32, 
https://journals-sagepub-com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/002070200706200104. 
2 
toward the Gulf region even increased after the revolution. During the Tanker War 
(1981−1988), “some 441 ships had been hit during the Iran-Iraq conflict,”3 and 168 of 
them were targeted by Iran.4 Recently, a few commercial vessels have also been attacked 
by Iran, such as the motor tanker Altair and motor tanker Kokua Courageous, which were 
hit in the Oman Gulf area on June 13, 2019. Moreover, Iran is accused for the attack on 
the Aramco oil installation on September 14, 2019. The hostile activities by Iran and its 
proxies in the region threaten the economy of the Gulf states in particular and the 
international community in general. The international community in general and GCC 
states particularly should take Iran’s enmity toward the global economy seriously and 
prevent any threat to the SOH.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This review evaluates the literature examining the severity of the Iranian threat to 
the Gulf’s oil output. With the rise of the industrial sector around the world in the past 
several decades, the Gulf region became a critical oil producer and exporter. The recent 
hostile Iranian rhetoric and enmity directed at the Gulf oil installations and transportation 
have prompted many writers to debate this issue. Most of the literature discusses the 
Iranian capability and willingness to threaten Gulf oil production. Yet, the level of Iran’s 
threat to the oil domain and the impact of such a threat on oil producers in the Gulf area 
are still unclear. Contributors to this literature address a few of these questions, such what 
Iran’s ability to threaten oil output in the Gulf is, which military capabilities Iran can 
exploit to menace this crucial region, and whether that threat will succeed or not. 
In his book, Tanker War, Lee Zatarian examines the Iranian weapon systems used 
during Iran-Iraq War, and he mentions that Iran deployed Silk-worm, a Chinese version 
of an old Russian Styx anti-ship missile, not only against Iraq but also in the SOH. He 
said that “the Silk-worm gave Iran the realistic potential to sink large tankers for the first 
                                                 
3 Lee Zatarain, Tanker War : America’s First Conflict with Iran (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2008), 386. 
4 Ronald O’Rourke, “The Tanker War,” in Proceedings  of the U.S. Naval Institute(Annapolis, MD: 
U.S. Naval Institute, 1988), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1998/may . 
3 
time, putting teeth into its threat to close the Gulf.”5 During the war, Iran attacked many 
oil tankers bearing a GCC or U.S. flag in the Gulf region. The Iranian threat to Gulf oil 
compelled European nations, such as the Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and Italy, to join the minesweeping forces in the Gulf region.6    
Several historical events in the SOH area demonstrate Iran’s tactics against the 
shipping in the region. For instance, during the Tanker War amid the Iran-Iraq War, Iran 
laid many sea mines in the Arabian Gulf. According to an analysis report from the U.S. 
Air War College, “168 ships were attacked by Iran from the period from 1981 to 1987”.7 
During that war, Iran employed its mine and short-range rocket capabilities to attack 
motor vessels in the Gulf area. 
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson and Miranda Priebe’s article “A Crude Threat: The 
Limits of an Iranian Missile Campaign against Saudi Arabian Oil” examines the Iranian 
ballistic missile threats to the oil installations in the Arabian Gulf region in general and in 
Saudi Arabia specifically. They offer an answer to the main question about whether Iran 
could use its ballistic missile arsenal to significantly reduce Saudi Arabia’s oil 
production. According to the writers, Iran could not significantly reduce Saudi oil exports 
due to limited Iranian capabilities versus Saudi infrastructure redundancies.8 The authors 
state that successfully attacking oil installations in the Gulf area, however, “would have 
many of the same effects as a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz”.9 Additionally, the 
writers suggest that an Iranian response for an attack on its nuclear facilities by launching 
                                                 
5  Zatarain, Tanker War, 34. 
6 Zatarain, 94 . 
7 Maedh A. Al-Lihaibi, “An Analysis of the Iran-Iraq War: Military Strategy and Political Objectives” 
(Montgomery, AL: Air War College, May 1989), 23, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a217255.pdf.  
8 Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson and Miranda Priebe, “A Crude Threat: The Limits of an Iranian 
Missile Campaign against Saudi Arabian Oil,” International Security 36, no. 1 (July 1, 2011): 170, 
https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00048. 
9 Shifrinson and Priebe,  “A Crude Threat,” 170. 
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missile attacks on oil installations in the Gulf region “should not be a significant concern 
for policymakers.”10  
Shifrinson and Priebe state that Iran would likely attack a high-value target in 
Saudi Arabia’s oil industry. For instance, Iran would not target the oil wells nor oil 
pipelines. Rather, Iran would target the Saudi stabilization facilities, where dangerous 
hydrogen sulfide is removed from the oil, or oil export stations such as ports. The reason 
for targeting stabilization plants, such as Abqaiq, is that it would restrict Saudi Arabia 
from safely producing the oil safe for export.11 In addition, stabilization stations would 
take a longer time to repair.12 Stabilization stations are an important part of the oil 
network. Abqaiq stabilization plant, for example, is one of the most important oil 
facilities, with a capacity to process 13 million barrels of oil daily (mb/d).13 The station 
processes two-thirds of all Saudi oil (6.1 mb/d).14 Furthermore, Shifrinson and Priebe 
discuss the missiles, such as short-range Shahab-1 and Fateh A-110 ballistic missiles, that 
Iran most likely would use to threaten Saudi oil installations. Although Iran possesses 
missiles with ranges able to reach the Gulf oil installations, these weapons are unlikely, 
according to the article, to cause significant damage due to the limited number in Iran’s 
missile arsenal,15 and due to the Saudi’s ability to rapidly repair any malfunction in the 
oil facilities. 
The writers concluded the article with a judgment that Iran is not posing a 
significant threat to Saudi and Gulf oil flow because of the low numbers and poor quality 
of its missile stock. Nevertheless, the Iranian-missile threat to Gulf oil output could 
disrupt the oil flow even if a missile misses the target and causes no physical damage to 
                                                 
10 Shifrinson and Priebe, 170. 
11 Shifrinson and Priebe, 177. 
12 Shifrinson and Priebe, 178. 
13 Shifrinson and Priebe, 174. 
14 Shifrinson and Priebe, 174. 
15 Shifrinson and Priebe, 192. 
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the oil installations.16 The missed-target missile attack would have a psychological 
impact that would “sow panic on the market”.17 
Caitlin Talmadge, on the other hand, in her article “Closing Time: Assessing the 
Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz” discusses the maritime capabilities Iran could use 
to harass naval vessels transiting the passageway. She explores the various ways Iran 
could use its military capabilities to close the Strait of Hormuz. In her article, she states 
that Iran may close the SOH by laying at least 2,000 sea mines in different parts of the 
Strait using multiple platforms such as frigates, corvettes, fast boats, helicopters, or 
submarines to deliver those mines. Although mines have low hit probabilities, they derive 
much of their power, as Talmadge explains, “from the fear they induce.”18 The other 
scenario is to use an anti-ship cruise missile fired from a speed boat, helicopter, or land 
base. The purpose of Iran’s use of anti-ship missiles in this scenario would be to attack 
U.S. naval ships and other motor vessels, especially oil tankers, in the vicinity of the 
Strait. Iran’s main goal in such an attack is to gain political advantages. In addition, 
Talmadge discusses the Iranian deployment of sea mines such as the M-08 North Korean-
manufactured moored contact mine, the similar M-26 sea mine, and the powerful MDM-
6 mine, as well as the C-802 Saccade, CSS-N-2 Silkworm, and CSS-N-3 Seersucker anti-
ship cruise missiles.19 
The Iranian dependence on the SOH may reduce the likelihood of a total closure 
of the passageway. An analyst from the Institute of Near East and Gulf Military Analysis, 
INEGMA, Sabahat Khan, argues that approximately 87 percent of Iranian exports and 
around 99 percent of its oil exports are by sea, and accordingly, Iran would be impacted 
                                                 
16 Shifrinson and Priebe, 200. 
17 Amos Yadlin and Yoel Guzanksy, “The Strait of Hormuz: Assessing and Neutralizing the Threat,” 
Strategic Assessment 14, no. 4 (January 2012): 13, https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/sites/
2/systemfiles/(FILE)1329719640.pdf. 
18 Caitlin Talmadge, “Closing Time , Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz,” 
International Security 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 91, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.33.1.82. 
19 Talmadge, “Closing Time,” 101. 
6 
by blocking the strait even more than other countries in the region.20 Yet, many analysts 
argue that total closure of the SOH “would be attempted as an absolute final resort of 
Iran.”21 
A report from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) titled Iran’s Threats, the 
Strait of Hormuz, and Oil Markets argues that due to its dependence on trade through the 
Strait, “Iran may be unlikely to attempt to close the waterway, but rather to shape the 
international debate on Iran policy.”22 In addition, the report discusses Iran’s options for 
leveraging the Strait. Moreover, the report emphasizes Iran’s vital need for the 
passageway due to its export and import of oil and other goods. Accordingly, the report 
discounts the likelihood of a total closure of the channel. The report mentions three 
Iranian options for the SOH starting from a total closure, which is regarded as a low 
probability event. The second option is harassment and infrastructure damage, which is 
similar to the Iran-Iraq conflict in the 1980s. This option, according to the report, also is 
unlikely to occur since it may alienate Iran’s remaining oil customers. The third option is 
to continue threatening the strait by conducting naval exercises close to the shipping 
lanes to disturb the ship’s movement and to raise tensions in the area. Moreover, the 
report states that even harassment, without total closure, would contribute to reducing the 
export of oil from the region, which would lead to increased oil prices. Besides, the report 
suggests that a complete block of the SOH “would likely contribute to higher global oil 
prices.”23 Accordingly, this practice may risk triggering a military conflict with Iran.24 
The question is how severe these attacks and practices are to the SOH region and what 
are the probable impacts globally of such campaigns. The majority of the literature 
                                                 
20 Sabahat Khan, “Iranian Mining of the Strait of Hormuz – Plausibility and Key Considerations,” 
Institute of Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA), (January 2010): 1, http://www.inegma.com/
admin/content/file-29122013113155.pdf. 
21 Khan, “Iranian Mining of the Strait of Hormuz ,” 1.  
22 Michael Ratner, Iran’s Threats, the Strait of Hormuz, and Oil Markets: In Brief, CRS Report No. 
R45281 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 6, 2018), 4, 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45281. 
23 Ratner, Iran’s Threats, the Strait of Hormuz, and Oil Markets: In Brief, 4. 
24 Ratner, 5. 
7 
discusses the Iranian capability and tactics either to threaten the oil installations in the 
Gulf region using ballistic missiles or sea mines to close the SOH or to harass ships’ 
movements in the vicinity of the passageway zone center by using mine warfare or short-
range anti-ship cruise missiles.  
Much of the literature discusses the Iranian threat to GCC oil production since it 
is regarded as one of the most critical regions in the world. Although most of the 
literature discusses Iranian intentions toward the Gulf area and whether Iran would 
succeed, this literature did not examine the severity and impact of such potential actions. 
In addition, most of the literature disregarded the Iranian options to exploit cheap and 
reliable technology, such as drone technology, to pose a threat to oil installations and oil 
tanker movement in the Gulf region. Iranian drones have already been used in various 
military capacities by Iran’s proxies in Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon. Consequently, this 
thesis also evaluates the likelihood that Iran will use a drone system to threaten Gulf oil 
facilities and considers the potential results from such attacks.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
There are three hypotheses to address the main question regarding how great a 
threat Iran poses to Gulf oil output, which are 1) Iran poses a low threat; 2) Iran poses a 
moderate threat; or 3) Iran poses a high threat. According to the literature reviewed, the 
most probable answer is that Iran poses a moderate threat to Gulf oil production. 
Although Iran possesses cruise missiles, mines, and drone weapon systems, it avoids 
using them against oil installations in the Gulf area. Iran realizes the risk of direct 
confrontation with Saudi Arabia and other GCC states. Yet, Iran might exploit its proxies 
in the GCC area to pose a threat to the region’s oil infrastructure. In the worst-case 
scenario, if Iran used its missile arsenal and drones to attack Gulf oil installations and 
shipping in the Gulf and SOH areas, it would pose a moderate threat to Gulf oil output. 
This hypothesis is based on several factors. First, Iran’s short supply and the poor 
performance of its missile and munitions stock make it unable to seriously threaten the 
Gulf oil sector. Second, Iran fully recognizes the risk of direct confrontation with the oil 
producer countries in the Gulf region. Any threat to the Gulf area is a threat to the global 
8 
source of oil. As a result, the international community would be affected by Iran’s threats 
to the Gulf region. Third, the GCC has rapid response capability and sophisticated 
systems to mitigate any loss of or damage to its oil network. Fourth, the existence of anti-
missile defense close to oil installations in the Gulf region would diminish the Iranian 
threat to these vital spots. Nevertheless, Iran’s threat to oil platforms and oil tankers in 
Gulf region using its missiles, mines, and drones, even if it did not cause much physical 
damage, would disrupt the flow of oil and the oil market. Accordingly, Iran poses a 
moderate threat to Gulf oil output.  
Furthermore, Iran itself is highly dependent on SOH for its exports, including oil. 
The recent U.S. sanctions, which have tremendously reduced Iran’s dependence on the 
Strait of Hormuz, however, have increased the probability of Iran attempting a full 
closure of the SOH. Yet, Iran realizes the significance of the strait to the Gulf region and 
the international community, and that realization may cause Iran to avoid direct 
confrontation with the great powers and the Gulf states. Besides, Iran’s threats to the 
SOH may cost it allies and customers.25 The United States has regarded the strait and 
Gulf oil production as vital to the health of the nation’s economy. On July 27, 2018, then 
U.S. Defense Secretary James N. Mattis replied to an inquiry regarding Iran’s likelihood 
of closing the SOH, saying: “Clearly, this [closure] would be an attack on international 
shipping and could have an international response to reopen the shipping lanes … 
because the world’s economy depends on those energy supplies flowing out of there.”26 
Yet, Iran’s threatening the SOH, even only verbally only, could impact shipping within 
the strait and consequently could disrupt Gulf oil production. So, Iran poses a moderate 
threat to Gulf oil output.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The thesis examines a combination of case studies, reports of analyses, articles, 
and books. The cases studied in this paper are the recent Saudi, Emirates’, and 
                                                 
25  Ratner, 4.  
26 Terri Moon, “Communications Key in Solving International Disputes, Mattis Says,” (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of Defense, July 27, 2018), https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/
1586793/communications-key-in-solving-international-disputes-/. 
9 
Norwegian motor vessel incidents near Al Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates, the 
sabotage attack on Japanese and Norwegian ships in the Gulf of Oman, the Shaybah 
oilfield incident, and the Abqaiq and Khurais attacks. These case studies provide a 
helpful source for clearer assessment. They also illustrate the enemy’s course of action, 
capabilities, and weaknesses. Another thoughtful resource contributing to this thesis are 
analysis reports issued by trusted institutions such as the U.S. Congress and well-known 
news agencies and schools. The significance of these reports is that some of them contain 
useful intelligence information that may support the main claim. Additionally, articles 
from news agencies are also useful references that may contain strong arguments. 
Although the previously discussed literature provided useful background information, the 
majority of these sources are not up to date. Moreover, some of the arguments in these 
sources have proved wrong. The Iranian military capabilities have changed, for example, 
and therefore its tactics and targeting probability have changed, too. The thesis uses 
updated sources, such as recent CRS reports, articles, research from think tanks, official 
websites, and the latest sources available. Moreover, Janes is also a useful source for 
information on Iran’s missile, drones, and maritime capabilities. 
F. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The research paper is divided into four main chapters. The first chapter has 
introduced the research question and hypotheses and presented a review of the relevant 
literature. Chapter II provides an overview of Iranian capabilities such as submarines, 
corvettes, small boats, mine warfare, missiles, and drone systems that Iran may use to attack 
oil facilities in the Gulf region. Chapter III looks at whether Iran is willing to use its 
capabilities to challenge the oil production in GCC states. This examination relies on recent 
case studies such as Iran’s attacks on oil tankers near Al Fujairah port in the United Arab 
Emirates and Gulf of Oman, and attacks on Shaybah and Abqaiq oil facilities in Saudi 
Arabia. The final chapter evaluates the overall threat that Iran poses to oil output in the Gulf 
region. 
10 
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II. IRAN’S CAPABILITIES AND MILITARY MODERNIZATION 
To analyze the Iranian threat to Gulf oil output, it is essential to understand Iran’s 
capabilities that could be used to threaten the regional oil infrastructure and shipping. In 
recent years, Iran has made great efforts to improve its military forces, modernize its 
existing weapons, and manufacture a variety of weapons such as small arms, mines, and 
missiles. Yet, its declining economy and U.S. sanctions have left Iran with limited 
resources and access to technology, leading the country to prioritize the development of 
weapon systems over other assets such as aircraft. For instance, Iran designated a large 
budget for missile technology, including ballistic and cruise missile systems in addition 
to radar and air defense systems, to deter potential aggression. In addition, U.S. sanctions 
impelled the nation to produce weapons through its local arms industries.  
Iran’s defense budget in recent years has ranged between 10 and 15 billion U.S. 
dollars per year.27 After the revolution in 1979, Iran divided its armed forces into two 
military forces. One is the regular military (Artesh), which is responsible to defend the 
nation from any external threat. The other is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC), which has the broader responsibility to protect the revolution inside the country, 
and export it outside. The regular Iranian Armed Forces and the IRGC both report to the 
Supreme Leader of Iran through a Joint Staff Headquarters. The total number of military 
personnel, not including internal security forces, is 525,000 personnel.28 And, as just 
mentioned, Iran’s military has numerous capabilities that the nation could use to threaten 
the Gulf’s oil output. This chapter describes the composition of Iran’s forces including its 
proxies within the region. Additionally, the discussion offers how Iran distributes its 
military and what capabilities those forces have that Iran would most likely use to target 
the oil infrastructure in the area. 
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A. IRAN’S FORCE COMPOSITION 
The Artesh is the regular Iranian forces that consist of four branches, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran Army (IRIA), the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN), the Islamic 
Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF), and the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defense Force 
(IRIADF). The IRIA is composed of 350,000 active personnel distributed among nine 
armored brigades, four mechanized infantry brigades, 21 infantry brigades, one airborne 
brigade, one special forces brigade, and five artillery regiments.29  The IRIA’s main units 
are concentrated in the northern, western, and southwestern areas of the nation, and their 
main mission is to protect the country’s territory.  
The IRIN is the nation’s regular navy, which includes 18,000 active-duty 
sailors.30 The IRIN is responsible for the Caspian Sea, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Sea. 
Moreover, IRIN’s main duty is to maintain the security of Iran’s territorial waters, 
defending Iranian ports and protecting Iran’s flagged merchant ships from piracy, in 
addition to safeguarding sea lines of communications (SLOC). Besides, the IRIN is 
responsible for counter-smuggling and protecting against illegal immigration and fishing 
within the nation’s territorial waters. Furthermore, the IRIN operates most of the Iranian 
submarines, frigates, and missile boats.   
The IRIAF is the regular national air force, composed of 50,000 active personnel. 
The IRIAF is responsible for patrolling the nation’s airspace and protecting the state from 
external aggression. Furthermore, one of the IRIAF’s roles is to conduct long-range strike 
missions in case of hostile action, with support from ballistic and cruise missile strikes. 
Nevertheless, the IRIAF is very limited in its resources and its reach due to decades-old 
platforms and limited access to the foreign air technology market.31 Therefore, the IRIAF 
is unable to effectively protect the nation’s airspace against enemies that have air 
superiority. In terms of its distribution, the IRIAF has three regional areas of 
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responsibilities, which are the Western Area Command (WAC), the Southern Area 
Command (SAC), and the Eastern Area Command (EAC). 
In addition to and separate from the IRIAF is the IRIADF, which was established 
in 2008 as a new service. It is independent not only of the regular national air force but 
also separate from the army and navy. The IRIADF is responsible for Iranian air defense 
capabilities by managing Iran’s regional air defense zone through the main 
headquarters.32   
The IRGC, on the other hand, is the Iranian revolutionary force that focuses on 
protecting the revolution and achieving the strategic objectives of Iran. The IRGC force 
provides support to Iranian’s proxies in the GCC region. The services it provides include 
training, technical support, and munitions supply. The IRGC also oversees Iran’s role in 
foreign conflict zones such as in Iraq and Yemen. Similar to the Artesh, the IRGC is also 
divided into the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps Ground Force (IRGCGF), the Islamic 
Revolution Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN), the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
Aerospace Force (IRGCAF), Quds Force, and Basij. 
The IRGCGF consists of 100,000 active personnel distributed among 31 
provincial corps.33 The IRGCGF is responsible to maintain the security inside the 
country. Composed of 20,000 active-duty sailors, is the IRGCN operates in the Arabian 
Gulf and SOH. The IRGCN is responsible for significant naval operations in addition to 
anti-U.S. operations in the Gulf area.34 On the other side, the IRGCAF is responsible to 
operate Iran’s missile systems in addition to the country’s Unmanned Air Vehicles 
(UAV). The IRGCAF also operates a few aircraft and helicopters such as the Russian Su-
22, the Falcon 20E fighters, and the EMB 312, and the AH-1J attacking helicopters..35 
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The IRGCAF, however, still has very limited air capabilities since Iran is relying on its 
IRIAF to protect its airspace. 
The IRGC also supports the Quds force (IRGCQF) and has provided them with 
multiple types of rockets, missiles, and munitions. The IRGCQF is the special operations 
force division of the IRGC. Moreover, it is in charge of all foreign deployments and 
activities. In addition, the IRGC Quds Force trains and supports internal volunteer 
militias and external clients and proxies in order to facilitate the nation’s strategic 
objectives and support the country in case of strikes from regional enemies. For example, 
internally, the IRGC commands the Basij Force, which is a volunteer force. Basij is one 
of the largest enterprises in Iran, encompassing over 15 million members.36 Externally, 
the IRGC supports and commands the Hizballah organization in Lebanon and some other 
GCC countries. Furthermore, the IRGC supports and guides the Houthi insurgents in 
Yemen and al Quds Forces in Iraq. Iran supports and directs these militias to threaten 
GCC interests in the region, including oil output. To avoid direct confrontation with 
regional countries, Iran will likely use indirect attacks on the GCC and regional 
countries’ oil output in the future through its proxies and clients within the region. The 
Shiite insurgents in the GCC states are another significant tool that the IRGC exploits to 
threaten the oil production of GCC states. 
The Houthi insurgents in Yemen are one of Iran’s abroad clients. Iran is providing 
the Houthis group with various kinds of support such as training, munitions, and financial 
support. The most significant support Iran has provided to the Houthi rebels has been the 
transfer of ballistic missile technology and the training to effectively use those weapons. 
According to a Congressional Research Service report, Iran provided Houthis with 
“military support in the form of assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, anti-
tank guided missiles, and more sophisticated cruise missile systems. Some of those 
weapons have technical characteristics similar to arms manufactured in the Islamic 
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Republic of Iran.”37 Iran supports the Houthi insurgents in Yemen with such weapons to 
threaten oil installations in the Gulf states. For instance, Houthi militias took credit for 
the UAV attacks against the Saudi oil fields in Abqaiq and Khurais in September 2019. 
Nevertheless, evidence showed that the attack could not have originated from Yemen.38 
Indeed, Houthi rebels are constantly targeting the GCC countries following Iranian 
directions. 
Additionally, Iran supports other rebels groups in the region, such as Al Ashtar 
Brigade in Bahrain, with training and munitions to threaten oil infrastructures. Through 
the IRGCQF, Iran could indirectly attack the Gulf oil output and critical sites. For 
instance, On November 10, 2017, a terrorist attack took place on Bahrain’s pipelines that 
deliver crude oil from Saudi Arabia to Bahrain. The explosion was most likely conducted 
by the pro-Iranian group despite Iran’s denial of the incident.39 
Thus, the forces that Iran is most likely to use to target GCC oil output are the 
IRGCN, the IRGCNQF, and the Houthi groups in Yemen. Among these groups, the 
IRGCN, which represents Iran’s naval forces, is mainly responsible for the Gulf waters 
and the SOH. With its assets distributed along Iran’s coast, the IRGCN is more likely to 
threaten the oil facilities in this region than the regular navy. The IRGCNQF and Houthis 
are militias supported and trained by Iran. These groups achieve Iran’s goals through 
their repeated covert attacks on GCC states. Moreover, Quds and Houthi forces perform 
their tasks separately from Iran, making the latter clear of charges in any attack.  
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B. IRANIAN BASES 
Iran has numerous air and naval bases distributed throughout the nation’s land and 
the Arabian Gulf coastal line and islands (see Figure 1). Several locations are used by the 
nation’s army, air force, and the IRIN in addition to the IRGC. The Iranian bases house 
the nation’s military platforms, personnel, and munitions, and these bases may be used to 
launch strikes against GCC oil infrastructures. In this regard, some of Iran’s bases present 
a greater threat to the Gulf’s oil production than other locations. 
  
Figure 1. Iran’s Naval Bases40 
For instance, Iran established several bases along its coastline that are maintained 
by the IRIN, the IRIAF, and the IRGC for their surface units, aircraft, and munitions. The 
bases, which include Assalouyeh, Basatin, Nokhaylo, Halileh, Nay Band, Dayyer, Bandar 
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Shenas, and Bandar Lengeh, bases pose a lower threat to the GCC states due to the long 
distances between these islands and the Gulf’s oil facilities. 
In addition, the Bander Bushehr base also presents a reduced threat to GCC oil 
output because the base is located close to Bushehr nuclear station, which is regarded as a 
critical Iranian site. Therefore, Iran would seek to protect this site rather than use it as an 
attack point. Furthermore, the base contains the first IRIN region HQ as well as the first 
marine brigade.41 The site is also being used by the IRGCN second regional HQ42 and 
hosts an airbase that belongs to the IRAF. According to a Janes’ report, Iran installed a 
permanent S-300PMU2 long-range air defense system at this site,43 but it is most likely 
that Iran equipped the base with air defense missiles to protect the country’s significant 
nuclear facilities. Therefore, there is less potential that Iran may use this base as an attack 
point. 
On the other hand, Iran has established the Bandar Mahshahr naval base close to 
the Iraqi territory, which may pose a medium threat to the region’s oil infrastructures due 
to its proximity to Iraq and Kuwait. The base is also a station for the IRGC’s third naval 
regional HQ.44 
Posing a greater threat are several islands occupied by Iran that are within closer 
distances to the Gulf’s sea and land oil platforms. These islands include Al Farsiyah 
(Farsi), Abu Musa, Sirri, Lavan, Lesser Tunb, Greater Tunb, Larak, Kish, Kharg, and 
Forur, and they are utilized by the IRIN, IRGC, and the IRIAF.45 Additionally, the 
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Islands are not only prepared with naval facilities for hosting naval ships and boats but 
also with runways for air assets. In particular, Al Farsiyah, Abu Musa, and Serri islands 
represent a higher potential menace to Gulf oil output due to their proximity to the GCC’s 
oil installations in addition to the facilities fitted on these islands. Moreover, Greater 
Tunb Island could pose an even greater threat to merchant ships entering the Gulf sea due 
to its very close proximity to the SOH. 
Another location of increased threat is Qeshm Island, which represents Iran’s 
largest island. The island is located very close to the Strait of Hormuz, which adds to the 
island’s value. Qeshm Island is used by the IRGC to station their vessels and midget 
submarines in addition to a 1,600-meter-long runway, which could indicate Iran’s 
intention to operate larger UAVs such as the Shahad 129, according to the Jane’s 
report.46 Additionally, the island is being used for UAV development as revealed by 
satellite imagery.47 The location could also be used as a further deployment for anti-ship 
missile systems, as well as a starting point for any offensive operations against shipping 
within the SOH region. 
Moreover, one of Iran’s most threating sites is the Bandar Abbas base in the 
Southern Gulf close to the SOH. The base is occupied by the IRIN’s second naval 
regional HQ and the second marine brigade.48 In addition, the location is an important 
spot for the IRGCN, which is exploiting it as a base for its first naval regional HQ in 
addition to its naval aviation command and three squadrons.49 The IRGC has also 
stationed many of its naval assets such as midges submarines, corvettes, small boats, and 
unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) in the Bandar Abbas base. The site also contains 
an airport used by the IRAF, and the location is fitted with a missile system operated by 
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the IRGCAF.50 According to a Jane’s report, most Iranian naval assets are concentrated 
at Bandar Abbas and Jask Island.51  
Iran is using a strategy based on force distribution among several locations to 
distract its enemies and also to make it more difficult to target the nation’s force, which is 
scattered across a vast area and many locations. In addition, Iran could use the 
commercial and private ports and jetties as temporary sites and attack points for its naval 
and UAV units. Moreover, Iranian missiles could be positioned in any spot along the 
coastline.  
C. IRANIAN CAPABILITIES 
Iran has naval and air units in addition to short, medium, and long range cruise 
and ballistic missile systems that could be used for an attack on oil output in the Gulf 
states. Iran also possess a large inventory of sea mines in addition to unmanned systems. 
Each unit and weapon is discussed in the following sections.  
1. Submarines 
Submarines are considered a strategic weapon for Iran due to their ability to 
launch cruise missiles, torpedoes, and sea mines. Moreover, Iranian submarines can be 
used for surveillance and information-gathering for longer-range missions. In addition, 
submarines could be used for mine laying activities.  
Iran has different types of submarines with different sizes and missions. The 
Iranian navy operates three 877 Kilo-class type submarines, the Tareq, Noor, and Yunes. 
The 877 Kilo-class submarine is a Russian-made submarine.52 The first one was 
commissioned on November 21, 1992. The submarine is 72.6 meters in length and has a 
maximum speed of 17 knots.53 It is fitted with six 533 mm torpedo tubes that can carry 
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different types of torpedoes including the Test-71 anti-submarine torpedo that reaches up 
to a range of 23 kilometers with a maximum speed of 35 knots, and the 53–65 anti-
surface torpedo, which has a maximum range of 19 kilometers and a maximum speed of 
45 knots.54 In addition, the submarine may carry 24 sea mines in lieu of torpedoes. The 
877 Kilo-class submarines are stationed at Bander Abbas naval base. In addition to its 
primary mission, the submarines could be used for mine laying as a secondary role.55 
According to a Jane’s report, the Tareq began being refitted in mid-2005 and re-launched 
in September 2012; it became operational in 2013. The Noor may not be operational in 
the meantime as it is expected to start being refitted, while the Yunes has undergone 
several maintenance periods in recent years in order to keep it operational.56  
The Ghadir (IS 120) is another submarine class that the Iranian navy operates. 
IRIN has 20 Ghadir class submarines.57 The submarine is a modified North Korean Yono 
class midget submarine with an overall length of 29 meters and a maximum speed of 10 
knots.58 The submarine is equipped with two 533 mm tubes and capable to carry Surface 
to Surface Missiles (SSM).59 The IS 20 submarines are based at Bander Abbas naval 
base. The Ghadir class is capable of maneuvering in a shallow depth area such as the 
Arabian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. According to an intelligence report, on February 
24, 2019, a Ghadir-type submarine fired an anti-ship missile using its torpedo tube.60 The 
missile seems to be a modified C-704 developed under the Jack-2 program. Additionally, 
the Ghadir class midget could be employed for mine laying operations, and it could be 
used to attack merchant shipping within the Arabian Gulf and SOH region due to its 
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small size and ability to maneuver in the shallow water combined with its capability to 
launch a variety of munitions like SSM, torpedoes, and sea mines.61 
Furthermore, the Iran navy has one operational Fateh class submarine in addition 
to two submarines under construction.62 The Fateh submarine is 48 meters in length and 
very similar to the Sang-O class North Korean submarine of a larger size. The submarine 
is fitted with four 533 mm torpedo tubes that can be used for mines instead of the 
torpedoes.63 Additionally, the submarine is capable to dive up to 200 meters below the 
sea surface for almost five weeks.64 At Iran’s Seventh Scientific Command and Control 
Conference in Tehran on December 10, 2013, Brigadier General Hossein Dehqan stated 
that “the testing of the operation of the first model of the submarine was successfully 
completed and Fateh will be delivered to the naval forces of the Islamic Revolution 
Guards Corps (IRGC) after it is adequately equipped and armed.”65 
Moreover, the IRIN operates one Nahang class midget submarine with an overall 
length of 25 meters.66 A Jane’s report claims that the Iranian navy is probably building 
two more of this class of midget submarine.67 The submarine is built with a smaller size 
to operate in shallow waters for the purposes of laying mines and as a mothership for 
swimmer delivery vehicles. 
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2. Frigates 
The IRIN frigates are mainly used in deep water areas such as the Gulf of Oman 
and Gulf of Aden. The main missions of the Iranian frigates are to conduct patrolling 
operations and represent the country in multi-national exercises. They also can be used 
for special operations like anti-smuggling and anti-piracy operations. For instance, the 
IRIN ship Alborz deployed to the Gulf of Aden to conduct anti-piracy operations in mid-
2009 according to a Jane’s report.68 However, since the frigates are exploited to protect 
the nation’s territorial waters, they are less likely to be deployed to attack the Gulf’s oil 
infrastructure.  
Iran possesses two different types of frigates, the Mowj and the Alvand. These 
Iranian frigates are operated and maintained by the IRIN as surface combatants, and they 
have been improved with modern, locally made systems. The IRIN frigates often conduct 
patrols in the open waters in the Gulf of Oman region and participate in multi-national 
exercises with neighboring countries such as India and North Korea. Iran has two 
operational Mowj in addition to five under construction.69 Iran also has three operational 
Alvand class frigates.70 
The Mowj class frigate is an Iranian-made platform constructed at the IRIN’s yard 
at Bander Abbas. The IRIN operates two ships of this class and is building five more. The 
operational vessels are the Jamaran and the Shahand, while Iran is constructing the 
Damavand, the Shiraz, and three others, according to a Jane’s report.71 The Mowj class 
frigate is 94.5 meters in length and 11 meters overall beam. Additionally, the ship has 
1,372 tonnes full-load displacement and its maximum speed is 28 knots.72 The frigate is 
fitted with four Noor (C-802) or Ghader (C-802A) Anti Surface Missiles and four 
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Standard SM-1 Block V Surface-to-Air missiles. Moreover, the vessel is armed with six 
324 mm MK-32 torpedo tubes. The ship is also fitted with one 76 mm gun along with 
either one 40 mm or one Kamand 30 mm gun. Additionally, the ship is equipped with one 
20 mm and two 12.7 machine guns. The ship also has a flight deck, which makes it 
capable of carrying helicopters.73 
The other frigate class the IRIN operates is the Alvand class frigate. Alvand class 
frigates were delivered from the U.K. navy in 1960, and they were renamed after the 
revolution in 1979.74  The IRIN has three frigates of this class, the Alvand, the Alborz, 
and the Sabalan, whilst the fourth one was sunk in 1988 after a military engagement with 
the U.S. Navy. The IRIN updated the Alvand type frigates to keep them in service. The 
ship is 94.5 meters in total length and 11 meters beam.75 The full load displacement of 
the vessel is 1,372 tonnes and its maximum speed is 39 knots. The ship is armed with 
four Noor (C-802) or Ghader (C-802A) Surface-to-Surface Missiles in addition to six 324 
mm MK-32 torpedo tubes. Furthermore, the ship is fitted with one Vickers MK-8 114 
mm, two Oerlikon 35 mm, and one Kaman 30 mm guns.76 Additionally, this frigate type 
is equipped with two Oerlikon GAM-BO1 20 mm and two 12.7 mm machine guns. Fitted 
also with Graseby 174 active search and Graseby 170 active attack hull-mounted sonars, 
this vessel is an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capable ship.77 
3. Corvette and Fast Attack Crafts  
Besides submarines and frigates, Iran has different sizes and types of missile 
boats that can be used for various operations such as patrolling, missile launching, mine 
laying, and harassment. The Iranian corvette fleet presents a higher threat to the GCC oil 
infrastructures due to their superior maneuverability, which enhances hit-and-run tactics 
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and shortens the time required to perform tasks. Moreover, the corvettes are fitted with a 
variety of weapons, making them a more critical threat. Iran possesses several fast attack 
crafts run by the IRIN and the IRGCN. For instance, Iran has two Bayandor-class 
corvettes that were transferred from the United States to Iran under the Mutual Assistance 
program in 1964, the Bayandor, which was commissioned in 2009, and the Naghdi, 
which commissioned in 2012.78 Each boat is 84 meters in length and has a maximum 
speed of 20 knots. The weapons fitted onboard the corvettes are four Noor (C-802) or 
Ghader (C-802A) missiles, one 76 mm Oto Melara gun, and six 324 mm MK 32 torpedo 
tubes.79 Moreover, air and surface radars are fitted onboard in addition to a sonar system 
to provide the boat with underwater capability, but these systems may have been 
removed.80 
IRIN also operates 14 French-made Kaman class fast attack missile boats and has 
four more under construction.81 The boat is 47 meters in length with a maximum speed 
of 37 knots. The Kaman class boat is fitted with one 76 mm Oto Melara gun and one 
Breda 40 mm Gun, and some of this class have a 23 mm or 20 mm machine gun in place 
of the 40 mm gun.82 In addition, most of the Kaman class boats carry four Noor (C-802) 
missiles. The Kaman class is the IRIN’s main platform for anti-ship missile delivery.83 
The boat also can be deployed for mine laying operations due to its high maneuverability 
and speed. IRIN also operates four Sina fast attack craft, which is the Iranian-made 
version of the Kaman fast attack missile boat.84 According to a recent Jane’s report, 
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another four Sina class boats are under construction, “including at least in the Caspian 
and two at Bandar Abbas.”85   
Furthermore, Iran has ten operational Chinese Houdong (Thondor) class fast 
attack missile boats that are operated by the IRGCN.86 The boat has an overall length of 
38.6 meters and a maximum speed of 35 knots. The unit is fitted with four SSM 
launchers that are capable to carry either the Noor (C-802) or the Ghader (C-802A).87 In 
addition, the boat has two AK-230 30 mm guns and two 23 mm machine guns. The boat 
is used primarily as a platform for delivering an anti-ship missile.88 
4. Small Boats 
Among the its surface fleet, Iran has various types of small attack boats. The 
majority of them are operated by the IRGCN. Small boats offer several advantages such 
as their low cost and high production rate. They are also difficult to detect by radars, a 
feature complemented by their very high speeds and superior maneuverability. Moreover, 
the majority of the Iran’s small boats are fitted with short-range rockets and mines. 
Additionally, some of the IRGC’s boats are able to operate below water, which gives 
them the advantage of surprise when carrying out surface attacks. Indeed, a small boat 
force is a crucial Iranian tool for targeting the Gulf’s oil installations and tankers. 
The IRGCN, for instance, operates nine C14 class attack boats.89 This boat is 
13.65 meters in length and reaches a speed of 50 knots. Although the boat is small, it can 
be fitted with four Nasr-1 (C-740) SSMs in addition to one 20 mm, one 12.7 mm, and one 
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12-barreled 122 mm machine gun.90 Four of these boats are a little longer (13.75 m) and 
fitted with a BM-21 122 mm Multi Rocket Launcher (MRL) and operated by the IRIN.91  
The IRGCN also operates ten Chinese-made MK-13 patrol craft.92 The boat is 
13.5 meters in length and has a maximum speed of 60 knots. It is fitted with two Nasr-1 
(C-740) SSMs in addition to two 324 mm tubes used to launch anti-ship torpedoes.93 
This kind of small boat could be used for night mine-laying activities, relying on its 
approximate capacity to carry three mines per boat.94  
The IRGCN, in addition, operates 15 units of the Peykaap I coastal patrol craft, 
which is built in North Korea.95 The boat has an overall length of 17 meters and a 
maximum speed of 52 knots. The craft is fitted with two 324 mm torpedoes and one 12.7 
mm machine gun.96 The torpedoes fitted onboard are most likely intended for disabling 
ships missions. Moreover, Iran has the Peykaap II, which is the slightly larger version of 
the Peykaap I and probably built by Iran. The boat’s total length is 17.3 meters and 
maximum speed is 52 knots.97 There are 25 Peykaap II in service and they are run by the 
IRGCN.98 The Peykaap II craft are armed with two missile launchers for Kowsar (C-
701) or Nasr-1 (C-704) missiles in addition to torpedoes.99 The IRGC also runs six 
operational Peykaap III coastal patrol crafts that are similar to the Peykaap II boats in size 
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and speed, but they are fitted with two 12.7 mm machine guns instead of the 
torpedoes.100 
Moreover, Iran has ten operational Tir (IPS 18) class coastal patrol crafts, which 
are made by the North Koreans and run by the IRGCN. The Tir class boats are 21 meters 
in length and can reach a speed of 52 knots. Each unit is fitted with one 12.7 mm machine 
gun and two 533 mm torpedoes. The boats are deployed for anti-surface ship missions. 
The IRGCN also operates 15 in-service Tarlan class inshore patrol boats made 
with an aluminum catamaran hull that is most likely a modification of a commercial 
boat.101 The craft is almost 12 meters in length and maneuvers at a speed of 50 knots. 
According to a Jane’s report, the boat has a 1.5 meters high pedestal located in the 
forward part, which is probably used as a support for a wire/laser-guided weapon similar 
to an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM).102 The boat’s role is not certain but it is more 
likely to serve as an anti-surface ship. 
In addition, Iran builds and operates 15 Kashdom class inshore patrol boats that 
are most likely run by the IRGCN.103 The Kashdom class vessel is 16 meters in length 
and has a maximum speed of 45 knots.104 The boat is fitted with one 23 mm and one 
12.7 mm machine gun. In addition, an MRL may also fit in the boat’s cabin.105 The craft 
is probably a modification of the C14 class boats. A developed version of this type of 
craft known as the Kashdom III and IV comes with a missile launcher, but the number of 
these boats is unknown. 
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Another fast patrol craft that Iran possesses is the Pashe (MIG-G-1900) class 
inshore patrol boat operated by the IRGC.106 There are ten of this class in service, and 
Iran is most likely to buy a local version of the U.S. MK II boat with some 
modifications.107 The boat is almost 20 meters in length and runs at speeds up to 36 
knots. The boat is fitted with a surface radar and two 23 mm machine guns.108 The IRGC 
also runs 30 boats of the Murcia (MIG-G-0900) class inshore patrol craft.109 The boat is 
9.2 meters in length and reaches a top speed of 30 knots.110 The boat carries one 12-
barreled 107 mm MRL in addition to three 12.7 mm machine guns and one RPG-7 rocket 
launcher or 106 mm recoilless rifle instead of the RPG-7.111 
Additionally, the IRGC operates ten Ghaem (MIG-S-1800) class inshore patrol 
craft assembled in Iran for patrolling missions.112 The boat is 18.7 meters in length and 
its top speed is 18 knots.113 The vessel is fitted with one Oerlikon 20 mm and two 7.62 
mm machine guns.114 The IRGCN also operates an estimated number of 100 Ashoora I 
inshore boats, which are locally made based on the U.S. Boston Whaler type craft 
design.115 The boat is 6.7 meters in total length and has a top speed of 40 knots.116 The 
craft is most likely to be used for mine laying missions. Some of these types of boats are 
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operated by the IRIN. Furthermore, Iran has approximately 20 Boghammar crafts, which 
are operated by the IRGCN and the IRIN.117 This type of boat has an overall length of 13 
meters and a maximum speed of 46 knots. The craft is fitted with one RPG-7 rocket 
launcher or a 106 mm recoilless rifle instead.118 The boat also carries one 12 barreled 
107 mm rocket launcher. The unit is stationed in Bander Abbas base and can be 
transported by larger ships to be deployed in another location such as the Farsi, Sirri, and 
Abu Musa islands.119 The boat was refitted in 1991 with new engines.120 According to a 
Jane’s report, there are approximately ten similar boats known as Torah that have an 
overall length of 11 meters and are run by the IRGCN and the IRIN.121 
One of the unique boats that Iran has is the North Korean-made Kajami class 
semi-submersible craft, also known as Zolfaqar.122 The IRGC has three  of these 
submersible boats in service.123 The boat has an overall length of 16.8 meters and a top 
speed of 40 knots. The vessel is fitted with two 324 mm torpedoes.124 The boat is most 
likely to operate in a concept of high-speed surface approach to the target, followed by a 
submerged phase in up to three meters’ depth, before it attacks the target through a snort 
mast. The unit’s main mission is anti-surface ship attacks due to its hiding capability. 
Another submergible boat the IRGCN operates is the Gahjae class semi-
submersible craft. The IRGCN has three in-service boats of this class that have an overall 
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length of 17 meters and a top speed of 40 knots.125 The boat is a stealthy design that 
produces a small Radar Cross Section (RCS), making it difficult for radars to detect. Each 
boat is fitted with two 324 mm torpedoes.126 
Moreover, Iran possesses many other small speed boats and Rigid Hulled 
Inflatable Boats (RIB) in addition to civilian fishing boats of different sizes and types that 
could support multiple activities, such as intercepting surface units, mine laying, 
attacking surface ships, delivering divers, and many other missions. Additionally, these 
boats could be fitted with rockets, Rocket Propelled Grenade Launchers (RPG), machine 
guns, small munitions, and surveillance equipment.  
5. Mine Warfare 
Iran’s mine inventory is considered as a crucial weapon for Iran to threaten the 
GCC oil tankers in the Gulf region. Iran depends heavily on mines in its naval strategy 
due to this option’s low cost versus the powerful damage they can cause. Mines can be 
laid by various kinds of platforms including submarines, surface units, small boats, and 
even civilian boats and fishing dhows. Moreover, mines are small, easy to produce, and 
require almost no maintenance. Consequently, mine warfare is an important element in 
Iran’s naval strategy especially after the Iran-Iraq conflict in 1988. Since the Tanker war, 
the IRIN and the IRGCN have rapidly improved their mine warfare capability by 
modifying their naval platforms to become mine-laying capable platforms. In addition, 
both navies have improved their inventory of sea mines. Iran possesses an estimated 
5,000 mines.127 Although the country is capable to manufacture mines, its advanced 
stock of sea mines is imported from other countries such as Russia, China, and North 
Korea. Iran depends on its mine inventory to attack an advanced enemy. As Lee Zatarain 
recounted in his book on the Tanker war, the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee 
report of June 29, 1987, noted that mines were a form of indirect attack that Iran might 
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favor.128 Recent incidents, such as the Al-Fujairah motor vessel attacks, illustrate Iranian 
tactics that use sea mines to threaten Iran’s enemies.  
Iran has different types of sea mines that could be used to attack surface and 
subsurface enemy platforms. Floating mines could threaten the fixed infrastructure in the 
Gulf area as well such as oil platforms and oil rigs. One mine that Iran possesses is the 
limpet mine. The limpet mine is a type of mine that is stuck to the hull of a vessel with a 
strong magnet. The mine is manually attached to the hull by divers in a covert mission 
and it detonates either mechanically or by time delay technique. The IRGCN and the 
IRIN special forces use limpet mines to attack merchant ships in the region. Moreover, 
Iran possesses the Russian manufactured MDM-6 bottom mine. The MDM-6 mine 
detonates within a radius of 50 to 60 meters in response to acoustic, magnetic, or pressure 
influences.129 In addition, the MDM-6 is a sophisticated sea mine that has an operating 
depth of approximately 12 to 120 meters.130 The mine comes with a 1,100 kg warhead 
and can be laid by the 533 mm torpedo tubes, or from surface units such as frigates, 
corvette, and small boats. Iran also has Chinese-made EM-52 rocket-propelled mines 
fitted with an acoustic fuse that operate at a depth of 4.8 to 183 meters.131 The mine is a 
300 kg warhead and it is guided in its rocket ascent phase. Considered one of the most 
powerful mines, it could penetrate the keel of a U.S. aircraft carrier, according to some 
experts.132  
Additionally, Iran has the M-08 moored contact mine, which is considered an old, 
unsmart mine. Although the M-08 is a World War I-era, unsophisticated mine, it can 
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cause significant damage to surface and subsurface units. Iran’s mine arsenal also 
includes the Chinese MC-52, EM-55, EM-31, and EM-11 sea mines.133  
Recently, Iran launched its first indigenous Swimmer Delivery Vehicle (SDV). 
The craft is eight meters in length and can carry three divers in addition to 14 limpet 
mines. The platform is used by the IRGC and special forces for mine-laying operations 
within the coastal area. This craft could be carried by a mother ship, such as the Hengam 
class landing ship (LSL), for the open sea and further deployment. Moreover, the IRIN 
and the IRGCN use a deception technique to distract the enemy from detecting a mine. 
For example, they disguise mines as tree branches, shipping boxes, or trash.134 
Although mines are easy to detect by sonar systems fitted onboard air, surface, 
and subsurface units, Iran relies on its inventory of mines to threaten shipping within the 
Gulf region. Sea mines are a potential weapon that Iran may use to attack oil tankers in 
the Arabian Gulf area. Several instances, such as the attacks on merchant ships near Al 
Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on May 12, 2019, reveal that Iran uses 
mines to sabotage motor vessels in the Gulf. Their low cost combined with their high 
detonation power makes sea mines one of the most likely weapons that Iran may exploit 
to threaten GCC oil shipping.   
6. Missiles and Torpedoes 
Iran follows an asymmetric warfare pattern due to the limited capability of the 
nation as compared to its enemies, including the United States. Therefore, Iran is relying 
on its cruise and ballistic missiles arsenal, in addition to its inventory of torpedoes. Most 
of the locally manufactured missiles are derived from China and Russia made missile 
technology. There has also been a good deal of development and refinement in the 
Iranian missile program. Iran’s missiles are a primary component of the nation’s deterrent 
strategy. According to a Congressional Research Service report, the intelligence 
community has said that Iran “can strike targets up to 2,000 kilometers from Iran’s 
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borders.”135 In addition, Iran could use its missile power to blackmail the GCC states, 
exploiting their weakness in missile defense, to achieve some goals such as raising oil 
prices, cutting oil production, or restraining their cooperation with the United States. 
Accordingly, the United States is supporting the GCC countries with anti-missile systems 
to address the Iranian missile threat.136  
Iran possesses different missiles of various types and ranges that include Close 
Range Ballistic Missiles (CRBM), Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs), and Medium 
Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM).137 Although “Iran is not known to possess 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs),” which can travel up to 5,500 kilometers,138 
U.S. officials have argued that Iran is working on a Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) to 
shorten the timeline to an ICBM. 
The CRBMs and the SRBMs have a maximum range of fewer than 500 
kilometers, while the MRBMs are capable of reaching up to an approximate distance of 
2,000 kilometers.139 Yet, the majority of the Iran’s missiles are SRBMs used for tactical 
missions.140 In addition, Iran has developed a Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM), 
which differs from the ballistic missile in some features like low altitude flying profile 
and multi-direction target attack capability.141 Furthermore, Iran has developed Anti-
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Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM), which are fitted on its frigates, corvettes, and fast attack 
boats. Iran also manufactures the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM) that are installed 
on IRIN submarines. 
Iran’s SRBMs comprise the majority of the artillery missiles used for short 
tactical ranges. Iran has about 100 reusable transporter-erector launchers (TEL), which 
are used to carry and launch this type of missile.142  Iran’s SRBM includes the Shahab-1 
(Scud B) and Shahab-2 (Scud C) missiles. The Shahab-1 has a range of approximately 
300 kilometers, while the Shahab-2 has an estimated range of 500 kilometers due to its 
lighter warhead.143 These missiles are capable to reach most of the Gulf oil installations. 
Although no accurate information is available about how many of these types of missiles 
Iran possesses, it is estimated that the country has 400 Shahab-1 and 450 Shahab-2 
missiles.144 Moreover, Iran produces the Qiam missile, which is based on Shahab-2 and 
has an improved range of between 500 and 1,000 kilometers.145 In addition, Iran 
manufactures the Qiam-1 SRBM operated by the IRGC’s Aerospace Force.146 According 
to an Iranian official, the Qiam missile is hard to detect by enemy anti-missile systems 
compared to previous missiles.147 In addition, Iran is using the Fateh-110 family of 
missiles that includes the Khalij Fars, Hormuz 1, Hormuz 2, and Zolfaghar. The 
difference between the different types of Fateh-110 missiles is their terminal seeker 
technologies.148 The missiles have ranges of approximately 300 kilometers.149 After an 
making additional improvements to the Fateh-110 missiles group, Iran unveiled the 
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Zolfaghar missile in September 2016. The missile has a range of 700 kilometers, 
according to Tehran.150 Furthermore, Iran developed the Fateh-313, with an estimated 
range of 500 kilometers.151 Iran often test-fires the SRBM during military exercises. The 
country is also using them for real operations such as attacking enemies within the 
region. According to a Congressional Research Service report, on January 7, 2020, Iran 
launched 16 SRBMs that were fired from different locations inside the country and 
attacked “two Iraqi military installations housing U.S. troops, Al Asad Airbase and an 
airbase near Erbil in Northern Iraq.”152 
Additionally, Iran produces MRBMs capable of hitting targets up to 2,000 
kilometers away.153 According to the National Air and Space Intelligence Center 
(NASIC), Iran probably has less than 50 MRBM launchers.154 The MRBMs Iran has 
developed include the Shahab-3, which is imported from North Korea and has a range of 
800 to 1,000 kilometers.155 Although the missile can travel for long distances, it is not 
very accurate. Therefore, Iran has developed the missile by making various modification 
types such as the Sajil, Ashoura, Emad, Ghadr, and Khorramshahr, all of which have 
extended ranges, better accuracy, and more lethality.156 The Sajil missile is a 
modification of the Shahab-3 with an improved range of 2,000 kilometers.157  This 
MRBM was first launched in 2007 under the name of Ashoura, which was subsequently 
changed to Sajil after unsuccessful tests.158  Moreover, Iran developed the Shahab-3 to  
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MRBM Ghadr-1 which reaches an extended distance and carry a smaller payload. In 
March 2016, Iran tested the MRBM Emad-1, which is a modified version of Ghadr-1. 
The Emad-1 appears to be a Ghadr-1 with Reentry Vehicle (RV) modification with 
longer range.159  In addition, it has an improved range of 2,000 kilometers with more 
probability to hit the target.160 
Iran has also developed Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM) capable of flying at 
low altitudes, which makes them difficult for radar to detect, and they can hit a target 
from different directions.161 In 2012, Iran announced its first LACM, the Meshkat, and in 
2015, Iran revealed its Soumar missile that has a range of 2,000 kilometers.162 In 
addition, Iran carried out the successful firing test of the Hoveizeh LACM, which reached 
a range of 1,200 kilometers and precisely hit its target.163 The Hoveizeh is a modification 
of the Soumar missile. Iran has also modified the Soumar missile to create newer 
versions, including the Qods-1 and the Ya Ali. According to a Congressional Research 
Service report, Iran used Qods-1 and Ya Ali missiles to attack the Saudi critical energy 
infrastructure in Abqaiq on September 14, 2019.”164 
Additionally, Iran produces ASCMs based on Chinese-made C700 series and 
C802 missiles.165 For instance, Iran developed the Chinese C802 to create an Iranian 
                                                 
159 McCall. 
160  Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing 
Regional Dominance, 45. 
161 “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat 2017” (Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: National Air and Space 




162 Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing 
Regional Dominance. , 46. 
163 Global Security, “Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),” https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/
world/iran/hoveizeh.htm. 
164 Katzman, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, 11. 
165  Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing 
Regional Dominance, 56. 
37 
version of the Noor. The Noor ASCM has a 120-kilometer range and is fitted onboard 
Iran’s submarines, frigates, patrol boats, and some of its small boats. The missiles also 
can be fired from coastal launchers and fixed wing aircraft. Other C802 modifications are 
the 200 kilometer Ghader and the 300 kilometer Gadir.166 Both missiles can be fired 
from either the seaborne platform or land-based launchers. According to a report from the 
Global Security organization, Iran would most likely use Ghader and Gadir missiles from 
shore launchers due to their longer range and to keep Iranian vessels safely inside their 
bases.167  
Additionally, Iran has developed the Chinese C-701 to create the Iranian-made 
Kowsar missile and the Chinese C-704 to create the Iranian version of the Nasr. The 
Kowsar missile has a 25-kilometer range and is fitted on the Peykaal small boat and can 
be from fired from coastal launchers. The missile is capable to sink small and medium-
sized ships, according to an Iranian official.168 The Nasr has a 35-kilometer range and is 
fitted onboard many IRIN and IRGCN platforms in addition to fixed wing aircraft and 
helicopters.169  According to a Congressional Research Service report, Iran has claimed 
that the Noor, Kowsar, and Nasr ASCMs are suitable for covering the overall Arabian 
Gulf, SOH, and Sea of Oman.170  
Moreover, Iran constructed coastal bases along the Gulf waters, and north of 
Bandar Abbas in the SOH area for the Raad anti-surface missile. The missile is a 
modification of the Chinese HY-1 and HY-2 (Silkworm and Seersuker) missiles. The 
missile achieved a range of 300 kilometers during a firing test in April 2010.171 
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Additionally, the IRIN’s aviation group has the Fajr Darya (FL-6) short-range anti-ship 
missile fitted onboard the ASH-3D Sea King and AB212 helicopters, which are operated 
by IRIN’s aviation group. The missile uses an electro-optical seeker that enables it to 
detect, identify, and select the target. The missile can attack targets within an estimated 
range of 30 kilometers.172 
In addition to its missiles arsenal, Iran possesses different types of anti-ship and 
anti-submarine torpedoes that can be fired from submarines, patrol ships, small boats, and 
helicopters. The Iranian torpedoes inventory includes the 53–65 KE Russian-made 
torpedo that is fired from the 533 mm torpedoes tube fitted onboard several IRIA and 
IRGCN platforms. The torpedo has a maximum range of 26 kilometers and can operate at 
a maximum depth of 366 meters.173  Furthermore, Iran possesses North Korean PT-97W 
and the CHT-02D torpedoes, which are fired from the 533 mm torpedoes tube. Both 
torpedoes can reach up to 13 kilometers and operate at a maximum depth of 14 
meters.174 
In addition, Iran manufactures the Hoot long-range torpedo which, according to a 
Jane’s report, is copied from the Russian VA-111 Shkval. The torpedo is capable of 
reaching a distance of 11 kilometers and Iran conducted its first firing test in May 
2017.175 The country also has the Mk-46 torpedoes capable of attacking targets within 11 
kilometers and operating in a depth of 366 meters.176 In addition, the IRGCN has the 
North Korean 32 cm torpedo, which has a range of 4.8 kilometers and maximum 
operational depth of 14 meters.177 
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Iran improved its missiles arsenal as a strategic weapon that the nation can use to 
deter stronger enemies. Moreover, Iran has established several locations to host shore-
based ASCMs along the Gulf’s coast. Some of Iran’s ASCMs are “fired from launchers 
that are mobile and camouflaged, making them more difficult to locate and destroy.”178 
On the other hand, Iran is more likely to use its torpedoes inventory against enemy 
submarines and shipping at closer range. It also may use them against oil tankers in the 
Gulf region in case of being attacked by a stronger enemy. 
7. Drone Systems 
Iran started manufacturing UAVs after the Iraq-Iran conflict in 1988.179 Recently, 
most of the Iranian forces, including the IRGC, are operating UAVs and Unmanned 
Surface Vehicles (USV). Iran is seeking strategic gains through its unmanned vehicles 
program. Due to the vulnerability in its air forces, Iran is pursuing production of 
unmanned systems because they are affordable and easy to manufacture. In addition, the 
U.S. sanctions on Iran have led the latter to exploit the cheap unmanned technology to 
achieve tactical and strategic goals. 
Iran developed the first version of its Ababil UAV in 1993.180 The last variant of 
this model is the Ababil III, which was first displayed in Iran’s media in December 
2013.181 The vehicle is 2.88 meters in length and is capable of reaching 240 kilometers 
in range. According to a Jane’s report, the Ababil III “has been shown carrying a 
television-guided munition believed to be a Ghaem guided bomb on a hardpoint under a 
wing.”182  
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Iran has also developed the Shahed 129 UAV, which has been operated by the 
IRGC since 2013. The air-borne vehicle is five meters long and capable to reach targets 
up to 2,000 kilometers range.183 The craft is intended to perform Command, Control, 
Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
operations, but also it can be fitted with anti-surface munitions for attack missions.184 
The UAV is capable of 24 hours of non-stop flight, and it could be armed with Sadid 
missiles, according to an IRGC official.185 
In addition, Iran produces several versions of the Mohajer UAV, which was first 
used during the final stages of the Iran-Iraq conflict. The UAV’s variants, including the 
Mohajer-2, the Moihajer-3, which is known as Dorna, the Mohajer-4, also called the 
Hodhod, and the Mohajer-6. The latest version of the Mohajer-6 is an armed drone in the 
Mohajer family and was revealed in April 2016.186 The Mohajer-6 is 5.7 meters total 
length and capable to reach a distance of 2,000 kilometers.187 The vehicle could carry 
missiles such as the Ghaem 1 for anti-surface strike missions. Furthermore, Iran 
manufactures the Sadeq UAV, which is believed to be a duplicated version of the U.S.-
made RQ-170 Sentinel UAV. The vehicle operates at an altitude of 25,000 feet and is 
fitted with an air-to-air missile.188 
Moreover, Iran has developed the Toufan UAV, which is a smaller size and high-
speed vehicle that makes it difficult to detect and respond to. The vehicle is a one-way 
UAV and its main role is surface strike using an optical sensor to detect the target.189 
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Iran also builds the Fotors UAV, which is regarded as the largest Iranian UAV. The 
drone has a flying ceiling of 25,000 feet and a maximum range of 2,000 kilometers.190 
The UAV, which is operated by the Artesh, can be equipped with many kinds of air-to-
surface missiles for combat missions and can carry out other missions like surveillance 
and reconnaissance.191 
Additionally, Iran makes the Karrar UAV, considered the first Iranian-made long-
range drone capable of performing surveillance and reconnaissance missions with a 
maximum range of 1,000 kilometers.192 The Karrar vehicle is believed to be a 
modification of the U.S. MQM-107 Streaker, which was exported to the country before 
the revolution.193 According to a Jane’s report, the Karrar can carry guided bombs such 
as the Balaban and Yasin.194 Iran also manufactures the Hamaseh drone that is capable to 
conduct both surveillance and strike missions. The drone is 5 meters in length and 
reaches a range of 200 kilometers, and capable of carrying missiles and a 107 mm 
artillery rocket.195 The UAV is run by the IRGC and it can conduct suicide attacks 
against land and sea targets.196 The vehicle can be used during the day and night, and it 
operates at an altitude from half a meter to 900 meters.197  
Moreover, Iran has the stealthy design Saegah strike drone that is copied from the 
U.S. RQ-170. The drone can carry up to four guided bombs.198 Iran also operates the 
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Raad-85 attack drone, which is capable of reaching 100 kilometers in range.199 In 
addition, Iran has several other UAVs used for reconnaissance missions such as the 500-
kilometer range Mohajem-92,200 the Yaser drone, which can fly in a radius of up to 200 
kilometers, and the Nazer mini-helicopter drone. 
In addition to its current UAV inventory, Iran is manufacturing USVs for use in 
surface missions such as reconnaissance and attack surface units. According to a report 
from the BBC, Iran revealed a highly maneuverable USV called the Ariana during a 
ceremony at the Islamic Azad University in Tehran on December 16, 2012.201  The boat 
can travel at a speed of 30 knots and carry a payload of four kilograms.202 The unit is run 
by the IRGC. 
These UAV systems are very accurate and can cause significant damage. 
Moreover, they are low-cost products. Accordingly, unmanned systems are most likely a 
weapon that Iran may use to target GCC oil facilities. Nevertheless, it is also most likely 
that Iran would provide UAV systems to its proxies in Iraq and Yemen and direct them to 
pose attacks on Gulf oil facilities. 
D. CONCLUSION 
By understanding the Iran’s capabilities that Tehran might exploit to threaten the 
Gulf’s oil output, it is possible to conclude which weapons Iran would most likely use to 
attack the oil resources in the Gulf region. Additionally, studying Iran’s capability can 
help to identify the potential actors who might initiate aggression threatening oil output in 
that region. The chapter has described most of the military bases and assets Iran 
possesses, including air and naval platforms in addition to missiles, torpedoes, mines, 
small arms, and drone systems. Despite U.S. sanctions, Iran continues to pursue its 
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domestic arms production to keep its military might. According to the Iranian capabilities 
discussed in this chapter, it is most likely that Iran’s strength lies in its missiles, mines, 
and drones inventory. These weapons are mainly launched by small boats and could pose 
medium threats to Gulf oil output. Iran is focusing on these technologies due to their 
efficiency and accuracy in hitting short-range targets, such as oil shipping and oil 
facilities in the Gulf region. Iranian proxies are also regarded as a critical capability that 
the nation has already used to threaten the Gulf’s oil infrastructure.  
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III. CASE STUDIES 
In 2019, there were a few violent incidents involving Gulf oil production 
infrastructure in which Iran has been either accused or suspected. These incidents, 
including attacks on civilian shipping and oil installations in the Gulf region, provide 
potential insight into Iran’s attitude and ambitions toward the Gulf oil installations. Such 
events can be studied to evaluate the Iranian intentions toward the GCC oil output, the 
approach Iran takes toward threatening its neighbors, and some of the tactics it can 
employ against the oil industry. Moreover, they are useful for understanding some of 
Iran’s strengths and weaknesses. Iran’s recent hostile activities against the GCC oil 
interests in the region also provide key knowledge concerning the actors who perform 
such actions. These activities also help clarify some of Iran’s potential goals in the Gulf 
area. 
This chapter discusses a few recent incidents in the Gulf area, which were 
performed by Iran or its proxies in the region. The chapter focuses on four main incidents 
that occurred in the past year. The first case is the sabotage attack on two Saudi, one 
UAE, and one Norwegian oil tanker in the vicinity of Al Fujairah Port on May 12, 
2019.203 The second case study is the explosive strike on two oil tankers in the Gulf of 
Oman, near to the SOH. The incident occurred on June 13, 2019, when Marshal Islands 
and Panama-flagged ships were attacked, resulting in fire and hull damage.204 The third 
incident was the attacks on Saudi oil installations in Abqaiq and Khurais on September 
14, 2019. According to U.S. officials, the strikes originated from southwestern Iran.205 
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The investigation showed the strikes were carried out with Iranian weapons.206  
Although there is no certainty about Iran’s involvement in the recent aggressions, the 
evidence points at the Iranians or their agents as the perpetrators of these attacks. Finally, 
the chapter concludes with a brief analysis of the cases, summarizing the Iranian tactics 
and operations used in the attacks. 
A. CASES 
The locations of the cases discusses in this section are identified on the map in 
Figure 2 at the end of this chapter.  
1. Al Fujairah, May 12, 2019 
The first case involves the sabotage attack on commercial ships in the vicinity of 
the Al Fujairah anchorage area on Sunday, May 12, 2019. Al Fujairah is one of the seven 
Emirates, and its commercial seaport is regarded as one of the largest bunkering hubs in 
the world. According to a statement from the Emirates News Agency (ENA), “four 
commercial ships [were] subjected to sabotage operations near UAE territorial waters, 
[but] no fatalities or injuries [were] reported.”207 The attack occurred in the morning 
local time at Al Fujairah anchorage area, and it targeted the oil tankers Amjad and         
Al-Marzoqah owned by Saudi Arabia, the Andrea Victory owned by Norway, and the A. 
Michel owned by the UAE. According to a Reuters report, the Saudi Minister of Energy 
said that “one of the two Saudi vessels was attacked in the UAE economic zone on its 
way to being loaded with Saudi crude from Ras Tanura port for delivery to state-owned 
Aramco’s customers in the United States.”208 Additionally, a report from The Wall Street 
Journal said that a “Saudi-flagged tanker called Al-Marzoqah, suffered an explosion after 
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its main engine caught on fire.”209 The Saudi Energy Minister described the attack’s 
result as significant damage despite no oil being spilled from the tankers.210 
The Norwegian ship also suffered a sabotage attack during the same interval 
while it was anchored at the anchorage zone off Al Fujairah port. Pictures from Reuters 
news agency show the oil tanker with a hole in its hull at the waterline level and the metal 
torn inwards.211  The UAE’s oil tanker also showed similar damage. A picture posted by 
the national news agency in the UAE shows a hole below the water line in the hull of the 
Emirati’s vessel, which seems that the attacker placed the detonation charge below the 
submerged part of the ship’s hull.212 
Although there was no certain information about the type of weapon used in the 
attacks, the director of the Joint Staff in the U.S. Navy, Rear Admiral Michael Gilday, 
said that the attacks were performed by the IRGC using a limpet sea mines.213 According 
to the U.S. official, an American destroyer in the region tracked 20 IRGC boats entering 
the UAE territorial waters a few hours before the attack.214 The U.S. official added that 
“divers on the Iranian boats planted the magnetic limpet mines with timers on the hulls of 
the four ships.”215 The Pentagon also accused the IRGC of the attacks. 
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According to a confidential assessment issued by the Norwegian Shipowners’ 
Mutual War Risk Insurance Association (DNK), the attack on the Andrea Victory was 
likely done by a surface unit belonging to the IRGC that maneuvered close to the vessel 
and launched an underwater drone carrying 30−50 kg of high-grade explosive to detonate 
on impact.216  
This assessment was based on a few factors including the probability that the 
IRGC provided the Houthi in Yemen with drone boats capable of attacking targets using 
a GPS system. Moreover, the shrapnel found on the Norwegian ship was very similar to 
that from drone boats used by Houthi insurgents.217Additionally, the IRGC had recently 
threatened to use force against enemies in the region. According to DNK, the attack 
occurred in an area six to ten nautical miles from Al Fujairah, and it was intended to send 
a message to the United States that Iran did not need to block the SOH to disrupt freedom 
of navigation in the region.218  
A month after the attack, a report issued by a joint investigation consisting of 
Saudi Arabia, Norway, and UAE concluded that the operation was sophisticated and 
coordinated and the perpetrator had significant operational capacity. In addition, the 
attack appeared most likely done by divers using a limpet mine and deployed from a 
speed boat. The report blamed a state actor as a most likely perpetrator.219 
On the other hand, Iran denied its responsibility for the attack, while its Foreign 
Minister said that the attack was performed by “extremist individuals” and further 
deflected blame by accusing the U.S. government of pursuing dangerous policies in the 
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region.220 Moreover, a spokesman from the Iranian Foreign Ministry said that the 
incident “has a negative impact on maritime transportation security.”221 Yet, Iran’s 
denial and statements could be an attempt to distance itself from the incident. 
2. Gulf of Oman, June 13, 2019  
A similar sabotage attack occurred on June 13, 2019, when Japanese and 
Norwegian oil tankers were assaulted, which resulted in extensive damage.222 The 
targeted oil tankers Kokuka Courageous and Front Altair were attacked while they were 
in the Gulf of Oman. Front Altair was a Marshall Islands-flagged ship that was sailing 
from Abu Dhabi’s al-Ruwais refinery to Taiwan with a 75,000-ton cargo of naphtha.223 
Kokuka Courageous was a Panama-flagged, Japanese-owned tanker that was carrying 
25,000 tons of methanol from the UAE to Taiwan.224  The U.S. Fifth Fleet received a 
distress call from Front Altair at 6:12 am. According to a statement from U.S. Central 
Command (CENTCOM), a U.S. MQ-9 drone arrived eight minutes later and observed a 
fire on the tanker.225 Less than an hour later after this incident, another distress call was 
received from Kokuka Courageous at 7:00 a.m. local time, 21 nm off the coast of Iran, 
and approximately 10 nm away from the Altair incident.226  
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A press release from Frontline Company stated that explosions had occurred on 
the Front Altair, causing the fire, and the company ruled out the possibility that the 
incident was caused by mechanical or human error.227 In addition, the company denied 
reports from the Iranian News Agency that the vessel had sunk.228 According to Reuters, 
a Taiwanese refiner, CPC Corp, said that the vessel was “suspected of being hit by a 
torpedo.”229 The attack resulted in a hole in the vessel’s hull above the waterline. 
Bernhard Schulte Ship Management, the manager of Kokuka Courageous oil tanker, 
released an official statement that the tank was damaged because of a “suspected attack.” 
They also stated that the hull had been breached above the water line on the starboard 
side.230 An official statement by CENTCOM says that the Japanese motor vessel Kokuka 
Courageous was attacked by an explosion, and likely a limpet mine left serious damage 
in the hull.231  The statement mentioned that at 8:09 a.m. the same day, a U.S. aircraft 
observed an IRGC Hendijan class patrol boat and multiple IRGC fast attack craft/fast 
inshore attack craft (FAC/FIAC) in the vicinity of Front Altair.232 Moreover, the 
CENTCOM said that an “IRGC Gashti Class patrol boat approached the M/T Kokuka 
Courageous at 4:10 p.m. local time and was observed and recorded removing unexploded 
limpet mine from the M/T Kokuka Courageous.”233 Additionally, CENTCOM released a 
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video showing the Iranian craft removing the mine from the oil tanker.234 Furthermore, 
on June 17, 2019, the Pentagon released photos taken from the MH-60R helicopter 
saying the photos show IRGC removing an unexploded limpet mine from the tank.235 
Nevertheless, Iran denied these allegations and said that the fire was due to technical 
issues.236 
The president of the Kokuka Sangyo shipping company, Yutaka Katada, said the 
tank crew thought the vessel was hit by flying objects. Furthermore, he said that 
“Something came flying toward them, then there was an explosion.”237 The U.S. 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo blamed Iran for the explosions “based on intelligence, 
the weapons used, the level of expertise needed to execute the operation.”238 The 
Pentagon also stated that “Iran is responsible for the attack based on video evidence and 
the resources and proficiency needed to quickly remove the unexploded limpet mine.”239 
The United Kingdom agreed with the U.S. allegations against Iran and said, in an official 
statement, that “It is almost certain that a branch of the Iranian militarythe 
IRGCattacked the two tankers on 13 June.”240  
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Both the Al-Fujairah and the Gulf of Oman incidents reveal Iran’s intentions 
toward the Gulf oil market. Moreover, they indicate the Iranian’s methodology for 
threatening maritime navigation within the Gulf sea area. The attacks show Iran’s 
capabilities to threaten the merchant ships in the region. The attacks also manifest that the 
IRGC is a crucial instrument that Iran depends on to menace the Gulf oil industry. Yet, 
Iran realizes the consequences of targeting the oil market and the significance of its attack 
to many countries, including Iran’s friends such as Russia and China. Therefore, Iran 
follows covert operations to distance itself from blame. The incidents also show the 
Iranian dependence on their sea mine inventory that offers detonation power and low 
cost.  
3. Shaybah Attack, August 17, 2019 
The attack on the Shaybah oil field in Saudi Arabia is another example of Iran’s 
aggression directed at the Gulf’s oil output. The oil plant is located near the Saudi and 
UAE border and approximately 1,000 kilometers from the Houthi-controlled area in 
Yemen.241 The facility is one of significance to the Saudi’s oil infrastructure that has a 
production capacity of 1 mb/d.242 Shaybah oilfield is a vital facility as described by the 
Saudi Energy Minister Khalid al-Falih.243 Al-Falih has also acknowledged the Iranian 
threats to oil infrastructure in the Gulf region by saying that the “attack was part of a 
series launched against the kingdom’s oil infrastructure, including sabotaged oil vessels 
in the Gulf of Oman and damaged pipelines.”244  
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The attack took place on August 17, 2019, in the morning local time. According 
to the Aramco 2019 annual report, Shaybah Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) was attacked by 
five UAVs, resulting in a small fire and limited damage to the processing and 
cogeneration infrastructure at the facility.245 The fire was quickly controlled by 
Aramco’s firefighting team.246 The restoration of the facility’s operation took two 
weeks.247 Pro-Iranian Houthi rebels in Yemen claimed responsibility for the attack that 
used a Qasef-2K UAV. The Qasef-2K is an improved version of the Qasef-1, which was 
identified by a UN panel of experts as the Iranian UAV Ababil-2 or Ababil-T.248 The 
drone detonates at 20 meters altitude and produces an elliptical-shaped pattern with a 
lethal range of 30 to 80 meters and a half lethal range of 50 to 160 meters.249 The 
Yemeni rebels released a video showing a Qasef-2K test-fire that indicated an 
improvement in the weapon’s attack profile to make it more effective..250 According to a 
report from the Security Council of the United Nations, however, a panel of experts in 
Yemen found that the drone used in the Shaybah attack was a UAV-X, which the panel 
referred to as the Samad UAV.251 The latest version of the Samad UAV is the Samad-3, 
which carried a warhead of 18 kg of explosive and reached an operational range of 1,200 
to 1,500 kilometers.252 The Houthis’ spokesman said that the movement had used Qasef-
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K2 and Samad-3 UAVs against several targets belonging to both Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE. The spokesman did not mention the type of UAV that attacked the Shaybah oil 
facility. Nevertheless, the Samad-3 is the potential drone used in the attack.  
The Shaybah oil facility incident reveals the Iranian ambitions regarding the Gulf 
oil output. Additionally, it shows Iran’s pattern and approaches to threaten Gulf states’ oil 
production. The attack also indicates the similarity in weapons used by Iran and weapons 
owned by its proxies in the region. Houthi rebels in Yemen, who also call themselves 
“Ansar Allah,” claimed they manufactured the UAVs used for the Shaybah attack. Yet, 
several investigations show a high similarity between the Iranian and the Houthis’ 
drones. For instance, a report issued by the Conflict Armament Research (CAR) 
organization mentions that Houthi forces unveiled a collection of UAVs in July 2019, 
which they claimed to be manufactured locally.253 Shortly afterward, the Iranian Press 
TV showed a short video profiling the same UAV type. The report also showed that parts 
of munitions found in the sabotaged locations examined by the investigation team lacked 
the lot number required to identify the weapon. Such findings suggest that the Houthi 
militia probably removed any part of the weapon indicating that it was Iranian-made in 
order to claim its production. 
The strike on the oil facilities at Shaybah emphasizes Iran’s hostilities against 
Gulf oil production capabilities. Additionally, it asserts the role of Iran’s proxies in the 
war against oil output in the Gulf region. Moreover, Iran’s clients in the region, such as 
the Houthi group in Yemen, play a significant role in achieving Iran’s objectives in the 
Gulf area. Iran provides these groups with instructions, training, and munitions to 
successfully perform attacks on Gulf interests. According to a report from the Security 
Council, a Houthi delegation, earlier in the week of the Shaybah aggression, held 
meetings with the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Foreign Minister Javad 
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Zarif at Tehran.254 The meeting was likely held to give advance instructions to carry out 
the attack. 
4. Aramco Attack, September 14, 2019  
A more serious strike against the Gulf oil sector was the attack on Saudi oil plants 
on Saturday, September 14, 2019, at 0400 local time. This strike targeted the Saudi oil 
facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais, which belong to the Saudis’ own Aramco oil company 
in the eastern part of the country. The Abqaiq oil plant is one of the most critical oil 
supply facilities in the world. It contains one of the largest oil fields in the world and is 
the main oil processing center for extra light and light crude oil.255 The plant is a key 
processing facility for Saudi Arabia with a maximum capacity of 7 mb/d.256 Khurais is 
also regarded as an important Saudi oil installation. Production at the oil field began on 
June 10, 2009, adding 1.2 mb/d of Arabian light crude oil production capability, 320 
million standard cubic feet per day (scfd) of gas dehydration, and 80,000 b/d of NGL 
production.257 Additionally, the plant is the largest intelligent oil field in the world and 
the second facility to be included in the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) prestigious 
Global Lighthouse Network.258 
The Saudi oil installations were hit by missiles and aerial drones carrying 
explosive charges most likely launched by Iranian clients in the GCC region. The attack 
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was the second on Saudi oil installations in one month after the attack on the Shaybah 
natural gas plant.259  
The Abqaiq attack caused explosions, fires, and significant damage to equipment 
at each facility. The fire had been brought under control by the company’s firefighting 
team by the early evening of the same day. Meanwhile, the assault temporarily reduced 
the plant’s oil production by 5.7 mb/d.260 Nevertheless, production was restored to pre-
attack levels within 11 days.261 
To investigate the incident, a team from the United States, Europe, Saudi Arabia, 
and the United Nations was established to look over the case. A report that resulted from 
the investigations contained pictures of fragments of the weapon used for the attack. The 
pieces found, including an engine and vertical gyroscope from a UAV used in the assault, 
were similar to components used in the Iranian-made Sahad-123 UAV.262 The report 
designated the drone used in the attack as an IRN-05 (Mohajer).263 Moreover, this 
material also had been found in Iranian drones recovered in Yemen, Iraq, and Israel.264  
Although the Houthi group claimed responsibility for the attack, a Saudi official 
said that the attack was not launched from Yemen. Echoing this view, a report from the 
Washington Institute also stated that the attack on Abqaiq and Khurais could not have 
originated from Yemen.265 The report, which was issued by the U.N. Panel of Experts on 
Yemen, stated that the attack was conducted by a delta-wing UAV and a Quds-1 cruise 
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missile.266 Additionally, the report suggested these weapons were most likely produced 
outside Yemen due to their high quality.267 The investigation indicated that the UAV 
used for the attack was a potential modification of the Chinese ASN-301 drone, which 
has a maximum range of 280 kilometers. Eighteen of these Chinese-made UAVs can by 
fired from boxes stacked together on a truck-bed, which is approximately the same 
number of UAVs that attacked the oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais.268 Additionally, 
the UAVs performed the attack fitted with two unlicensed copies of either a British AR-
731 or its Chinese version, the MDR-208 engines. According to the report, Iran has 
manufactured at least two local versions of the MDR-208 that were used in the Iranian 
UAVs the Shahed-783 and the Serat-01.269 The report also indicated that Iran obtained a 
number of ASN-301 drones in the past. Referring to data regarding horsepower, fuel 
capacity, and fuel consumption, the U.N. team found that UAVs fitted with these types of 
motors can travel up to distances of 180 to 300 kilometers, which is closer to the ASN-
302’s range.270 
The Qud-1 is a short-range cruise missile (SRCM) fitted with a copy of the Czech 
PBS TJ100 turbo-jet engine.271 Although the Houthis displayed the missile in July 2019, 
its high quality suggested that it was produced outside Yemen, most likely in Iran.272 
Moreover, the range of the missile is shorter than the distance from Yemen to Abqaiq, 
which also indicated that the attack was not launched from Yemen. The Saudi Defense 
ministry spokesman Col. Turki Al-Malki said, in a media conference, that seven cruise 
missiles had been launched at Abqaiq and Khurais. Four missiles struck the Khurais 
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oilfield and the other three fell short of Abqaiq.273 Col. Al-Malki also said that the 
missiles had all come from a northerly direction.274 The direction of the attack indicates 
that the attack was not launched from Yemen. The attack is more likely to have been 
conducted from the Arabian Gulf or the IRGC base. The Abqaiq investigation panel 
examined parts seized by the U.S. Navy from a flagless dhow in the Arabian Sea on 
November 25, which found several weapons including a Quds-1 missile with a computer 
terminal keyboard in Farsi.275 Furthermore, according to fragments of the weapon found 
at the attack site and items seized during the November dhow interdiction, the panel 
concluded that the drone used for the strike had a maximum range of 540 to 900 
kilometers, and the cruise missile 700 to 800 kilometers.276 
Therefore, the panel argued that the trajectory and the range information from the 
incident contradicted the Houthis’ claim of responsibility. The U.N. team asserted that 
the attack on Abqaiq came from the North/Northwest, while the Khurais attack came 
from the North/Northeast.277  Moreover, according to a Western intelligence source, 
some craft flew over Iraq and Kuwait before striking the Saudi oil facility.278 These data 
indicate that the attack’s location is far away from the Houthi-held territory. According to 
the report, the attack could have been launched from anywhere with a 300 kilometer 
radius inside Saudi Arabia, across the Arabian Gulfwhether from the IRGC base near 
the port of Dayyer, from Farsi Island, or from a modified semi-submersible.279  
Accordingly, the attack could not have been launched from Yemen due to the 
maximum ranges of the drones and missiles used as well as the complexity of these 
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weapons, which make them unlikely to have been produced by the Houthi insurgents. 
The panel confirmed that Iran violated the international embargo by supplying the 
Houthis, who are still able to obtain parts that could be used to manufacture missiles and 
drones.280 The Houthis’ capability, however, is limited to ranges shorter than the range 
to Saudi’s oil plant in Abqaiq. 
Thus, the Abqaiq incident was most likely planned and executed by Iran or its 
clients in Iraq. The incident is one of several cases that indicate the Iranian intention to 
disrupt oil output in the Gulf area. According to a report by the American Enterprise 
Institute, the attack could have been aimed to pressure the GCC states and Europeans to 
“break with Washington and cut deals with Iran.”281 Iran’s attacks on ships in the 
Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, strikes against oil facilities, and attacks on U.S. interests 
in the region form a pattern in Iran’s military response to the U.S. sanctions.282 Another 
presumed motivation behind the attack was an Iranian intention to send a message to Tel 
Aviv regarding the nation’s strength and capabilities.283 The message also includes 
Iran’s willingness to escalate without engaging in an open and direct confrontation with 
Israel.284 Hence, the Aramco case shed light on the Iranian objectives in threatening the 
Gulf oil industry. The attack was a likely consequence of U.S.-Iran tensions. According 
to a Congressional Research Service report, rising U.S.–Iran tensions have led to several 
attacks on Gulf oil installations perpetrated or supported by Iran.285  
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B. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the cases offered in this chapter present the Iranian pattern of 
threatening the oil shipping and infrastructure in the Gulf region. The investigations 
performed after each case, and the remaining parts of the weapons used, indicate that Iran 
had a hand in the attacks. Iran is known to leave fingerprints behind any attack or 
suspicious operations. Based on incidents discussed in the chapter, it is obvious that there 
are similarities in the methods and weapons used in these attacks, particularly in the 
damage caused, fragments found, or even Farsi logos or writing. For instance, the holes 
in the oil tankers caused by the explosive in the Al Fujairah incident are very similar to 
those in the Gulf of Oman attack on June 13. The investigations carried out after both 
incidents, to explore the case in detail and examine evidence in depth, asserted that limpet 
mines were used in the attack. Also, the debris from missiles used in the Abqaiq attack 
was identical to parts founded at the Shaybah oil plant, which was hit a month earlier. 
These wreckages contained parts identical to those used in Iranian-made weapons and 
drones.  
Additionally, in each case, the perpetrator followed almost the same tactics, for 
example, the covert operation used in each attack, and attacked a similar target. 
Furthermore, the victim in every case was either an oil tanker or oil installation. The 
targets’ similarity is evidence that the offender is the same. According to the previously 
examined incidents, all signs indicate that Iran or its proxies are guilty. 
The attacks on several oil tankers and oil infrastructures in the GCC region show 
the Iranians are very likely the aggressors toward the civilian vessels. In addition, it 
reveals the tactics and methods Iran uses in threatening motor vessels and oil installations 
in the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman area. Additionally, the aggressions 
demonstrate the potential targets for Iranian offensive operations. They also reveal Iran’s 
hostile ambitions toward the Gulf oil market. The Iranian attacks also aimed to show that 
nation’s missile and drone capabilities. Iran was sought to take advantage of increased oil 
prices due to the attacks on oil output in the Gulf region. For instance, the attack on the 
Saudi oil plants in Abqaiq disrupted Saudi oil production that led to a 5 percent reduction 
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in the global oil supply.286  The decline in oil supply increases oil prices only 
temporarily. Thus, Iran did not much benefit from that increase.  
Iran depends on its cruise missiles and UAV inventories to attack regional oil 
platforms. The missiles are accurate and have high destructive power. Additionally, Iran 
manufactures different kinds of missiles and delivers them to its proxies in the region. 
The missiles, too, can be launched from different platforms and locations. Additionally, 
some varieties of missiles can fly at low altitudes, making them difficult to detect and 
destroy. Iran also relies on its UAV technology. The risk of such technology lies in its 
accuracy enabled by a sophisticated camera that facilitates the control of the drone to 
precisely hit the target. Moreover, these drones are capable of carrying a high explosive 
charges that can cause serious casualties. At the same time, the drone systems are simple 
and relatively cheap to produce, which makes them very easy to manufacture and use. 
Indeed, drone systems could be a modification from commercial production. 
Furthermore, Iran recently has used Yemen land as a testing ground for its weapon 
systems innovations. Iran also deploys its IRGC for clandestine attack missions against 
oil facilities in the GCC area.  
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Oil is a crucial resource for the Gulf states and many countries in the world, and 
the Gulf region is the major international oil distributor. After Iran’s revolution in 1979, 
the tension between Tehran and its Gulf neighbors increased, making oil a potential target 
for inter-state aggression. Oil production and distribution was targeted by both sides 
during the Iran-Iraq War, and more recently Iran has been accused of several attacks on 
oil shipping and facilities in the Gulf area in response to Gulf support for U.S. sanctions 
against Iran. Iran also supports, trains, and arms several militias and proxies in the wider 
Gulf region. Hence, the Iranian threat to the Gulf oil sector is apparent. Through case 
studies, this thesis has examined Iran’s ability, willingness, and methods to carry out its 
threats to Gulf oil output. Understanding Iran’s capabilities  can help to determine that 
country’s ability to attack Gulf oil interests and the level of destruction from such an 
attack, while the case studies introduce real examples that improve that understanding 
and provide practical proof of the likelihood of such attacks in the future. 
Iran’s capabilities are represented in its military forces (the Artesh), which is 
composed of 418,000 active duty personnel;288 however, the most threatening branch is 
the IRGC. Having the Gulf of Oman area as its primary responsibility, the Artesh navy 
poses a low threat to the Gulf oil sector. The IRGC consists of 130,000 active duty 
personnel289 and is responsible for the Gulf region and the Strait of Hurmuz. Because the 
IRGC has established several locations on islands close to the Gulf countries, it appears 
poised to use those locations to launch attacks against Gulf countries’ oil output. Some 
locations, such as Basatin, Dayyer, Farsiyah, Abu Musa, and Qeshm, present a higher 
threat than other island bases due to their proximity to Gulf states and the SOH. 
Moreover, the IRGC also commands and directs regional proxies, such as the Houthi 
rebels, to attack Gulf oil facilities. Thus, the IRGC poses a high threat to the production 
and distribution of oil in the Gulf area. 
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The IRGC possesses numerous air and marine vessels fitted with cruise missiles, 
machine guns, and mines that could threaten the oil installations in the Gulf region. Iran’s 
naval assets can be used to disrupt shipping of oil in the Gulf and SOH areas. For attacks 
from varying ranges, Iran depends on its highly accurate and lethal missiles that present a 
significant threat to neighboring states. Additionally, the IRGC operates several types of 
UAVs capable of reaching long distances for C4ISR operations and to deliver Iran’s 
missiles. The UAV systems are very accurate and can cause significant damages. 
Moreover, drones are low-cost and easy to manufacture locally. Accordingly, Iran’s 
expanding drone inventory presents a high threat to regional oil installations.    
The research examined for this paper focused on several recent incidents that 
indicate the Iran’s ability to threaten or disrupt the shipping of oil in the Gulf region is 
limited. Moreover, they reveal Iranian tactics and course of action to attack the oil sector 
in the GCC region. As previously discussed, for example, the sabotage attacks on oil 
tankers in the vicinity of Al Fujairah on May 12, 2019, and in the Gulf of Oman on June 
13, 2019, indicate Iran’s maneuvers and approaches to disrupt shipping at anchorage 
zones. Additionally, recent cases reveal the Iranian means and weapons used for the 
aggressions. The attacks were performed through covert operations and most likely were 
conducted at night. Although Iran has denied its involvement in the aforementioned 
attacks, both attacks were similar in procedure and material used, indicating the same 
actor. The Iran’s secrecy following both attacks and its denial of any responsibility for 
the action may indicate Tehran’s fear of a reaction from the international community. 
Furthermore, this secrecy reflects Iran’s inability to pursue direct confrontation. 
The Shaybah oilfield attack shows the role of Iran’s proxies in the region and their 
significant contribution to the battle on oil industries in the Gulf states. Furthermore, the 
incident reveals the drone systems’ capability and the long ranges they can reach. The 
risk of these UAVs lies in their ability to carry a high amount of explosives that could 
cause significant damage. Moreover, most types of drones can be controlled through a 
high-performance camera that improves the hit probability and increases the precision of 
the attack. Nevertheless, the Abqaiq and Khurais attacks show Iran’s limited capabilities 
in carrying out such strikes on the Gulf’s oil installations. Specifically, the incident 
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emphasizes Iran’s reliance on its short-range missiles and UAV systems to perform 
attacks on land oil infrastructures in the Gulf area. Furthermore, the incident illustrates 
the significance of these missiles, especially as their accuracy and destructive power 
improves, which can cause remarkable damage.   
The main question addressed by this thesis is: does Iran threaten the Arabian Gulf 
oil output? Three hypotheses were tested to address the thesis question: Iran poses a low-
level threat, a moderate-level threat, or a high-level threat to the Gulf oil output. Based on 
the analysis presented, the categories of low and high threat are largely unsupported. The 
low-level threat hypothesis is most unlikely. As described, Iran possesses a variety of 
missiles with different ranges and detonation power. Although Iran’s missiles are locally 
made and lack high performance, they can cause considerable damage and cannot be 
neglected. Moreover, Iran’s missiles can be launched from land platforms, submarines, 
patrol craft, and even small boats, making them versatile and effective weapons. 
Iran also produces several types of sea mines and UAV systems. Such weapons 
could cause damage to and interruptions in regional oil output as shown in recent 
incidents. Moreover, Tehran provides its regional proxies with Iranian made missiles. 
These groups present a potential threat to the Gulf countries despite their lack of 
experience and the primitive technology they use. Missiles seized or otherwise acquired 
by these proxies pose a threat to oil production in the Gulf. The variety of weapon 
systems and number of proxies within the region make the low-threat level hypothesis 
irrational. 
The high-level threat hypothesis is also unlikely. Iran’s economic decline hinders 
the nation from developing its military arsenal or buying more weapons. The economic 
dilemma similarly restrains Iran’s support to its clients in the region. Additionally, budget 
constraints prevent Tehran from buying more advanced weapons that could pose a high 
threat to the region. Moreover, Iran lacks access to the global military technology market. 
The sanctions imposed on Iran prevent Tehran from purchasing updated military products 
from the global market and compel that country to rely on local manufacturing, which is 
rudimentary and lacks robust production capability. 
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The presence of the U.S. forces in the Gulf region, to protect critical oil resources, 
is also an important factor that reduces Tehran’s threat to regional oil output. The U.S. 
troops in the Gulf area deter Iran from critical aggression directed at the oil industry in 
the Gulf countries. Moreover, the American Navy patrolling in the Gulf waters 
diminishes IRGCN threats to oil tankers sailing throughout the area. Additionally, U.S. 
surveillance and scouting aircraft are tracking Iranian movements in the Arabian Gulf and 
SOH area. Such Combat Air Patrol (CAP) minimizes Iran’s threat to Gulf countries and 
navigation in the Gulf’s waters. These efforts are further enhanced by the U.S. 
intelligence service, which gathers information on Iranian behavior and intentions within 
the region. Such vital information helps reduce Iran’s threat to Gulf states. Thus, the U.S. 
presence in the Gulf prevents any significant threat from Iran to the region.  
Moreover, Iran lacks the requisite advanced military, power projection 
capabilities, and sophisticated air and air defense forces to carry out a devastating attack. 
The air force is the first line for attacking enemies or defending nations, but Iran’s air 
force is ailing. Most of their planes are either grounded or obsolete and could not 
compete with the air forces of other Gulf countries. This disadvantage is exacerbated by 
Iran’s fragile economy that limits Tehran’s access to the global defense market. That fact 
coupled with a rudimentary military reduces the likelihood of high threat from Iran. 
Additionally, Iran faces internal security crises and divisions that restrict the 
nation’s external operations. Many Iranian citizens are suffering from poverty and 
unemployment. Tehran has experienced several rebellions and uprisings during the past 
decade. These internal issues challenge the regime and undermine Iran’s ability to 
severely threaten oil production in other Gulf countries. The recent U.S. sanctions on Iran 
also hinder the country’s capability to pose a high threat to neighboring states. Thus, 
Iran’s threat to the oil sector in the Gulf region is unlikely to rise to a high threat level.  
Therefore, this analysis shows that Iran most likely poses a moderate threat level. 
The information and cases discussed in the paper support this hypothesis. Iran imports 
and manufactures a large number of missiles. Yet, Iran’s missiles are of low performance 
and in limited supply. As discussed, Iran is heavily reliant on domestically produced 
missiles, but it lacks professional manufacturing capability of this type. Consequently, 
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most of Iran’s missiles are outdated and undeveloped. The threat from such missiles is 
undermined by their low performance. As a result, Iran’s missiles could likely present a 
moderate threat. 
Moreover, Iran understands the risk of direct engagement with the regional 
countries, so it launches attacks through a network of regional proxies. These proxies are 
unable to pose a high threat due to their lack of advanced weapons and adequate training. 
Additionally, the Gulf states in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, operate many oil 
fields distributed among several locations. The redundancies of oil installations scattered 
among thousands of square miles diminish the probability of a major threat. Furthermore, 
most Gulf countries deploy high performance and advanced missile defense systems that 
are capable of intercepting any missile and drone attacks orchestrated by Iran through its 
proxies. The majority of vital oil installations in the Gulf countries are protected by 
effective anti-air defense batteries to intercept airstrikes. Such systems minimize the 
Iranian threat to the oil facilities. 
As oil is a global commodity that represents the primary energy source for many 
countries, Iran has long realized the significance of oil to international society. 
Accordingly, Iran is very cautious in its war against oil exports in the Gulf area, and 
Tehran is unlikely to pose a significant threat to the Gulf’s oil infrastructure out of fear of 
the expected violent response from the international community, including Iran’s friends. 
Additionally, any instability in the oil market in the region will have negative 
consequences on Tehran as an oil exporter country. Thus, Iran is unlikely to seriously 
threaten Gulf oil production.  
According to the case studies discussed earlier in the thesis, the attacks on oil 
tankers off Al Fujairah and the Gulf of Oman demonstrate the level of Iran’s threat to oil 
shipping in the region. The sabotage attack resulted in small size holes in the vessel’s 
hull. The damage was not critical and the attacks did not disrupt the oil market. 
According to the U.S. Energy Department, the oil markets remained at a stable supply.290 
                                                 
290 Jon Gambrell, “Tankers Reported Damaged off UAE on Major Oil Trade Route,” AP News, May 
13, 2019, https://apnews.com/article/3884ea5ef0084d7a9e8a7d48c03fb69e. 
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Rather than having much physical impact, the attack had a psychological one. The attacks 
illustrated that Tehran is capable of attacking oil shipping in the region despite the limited 
damage from these attacks. The incidents also showed that the Iranian threat to regional 
oil output is a most likely moderate one.   
Turning to land-based oil facilities, the attack on the Shaybah oil field caused a 
fire and some damage to a few parts in the plant, including processing and cogeneration 
units. Nevertheless, no human injuries were reported and plant operations were restored 
in two weeks. Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s Aramco continued providing its customers with 
oil supplies from alternative oil facilities. The Abqaiq attack, likewise, resulted in a small 
fire that was controlled within the same night. Although 54 percent of the crude oil 
supply was temporarily suspended by the attack, oil production resumed within 11 days 
and the impact on oil markets proved insignificant. While the outcomes of these attacks 
were insignificant, Iran demonstrated its determination and ability to reach and attack oil 
facilities of other Gulf countries and to achieve limited or temporary damage. 
Accordingly, Iran’s threat to oil infrastructure in the Gulf region is moderate.  
In conclusion, Iran’s threat to Gulf oil output is moderate. In terms of capability, 
the research showed that Iran develops a variety of weapon systems, including missiles 
and mines. Yet, as the research also showed, Iran is unlikely to employ its arsenal 
through direct confrontation. It prefers covert methods and is often assisted by a few 
regional proxies. Overall, Iran faces several constraints that contain its threat level, such 
as its rudimentary weapon systems, aged military equipment, declining economy, U.S. 
sanctions, U.S. presence in the region, and internal security crises. Nevertheless, Iran’s 
oil producing neighbors in the Gulf should take steps to improve their anti-air capabilities 
and maintain advanced air defense systems to deter any future Iranian aggression. 
Sophisticated anti-air systems could prevent Iran’s threat to Gulf oil installations. 
Additionally, Gulf countries should strengthen and expand their naval forces with 
additional fast patrol boats and vessels with updated command and control systems. 
Moreover, these countries should enhance their maritime coordination to prevent further 
attacks on merchant shipping in the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.   
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